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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis first reviews the literature on humour experiences in adults experiencing 
psychosis. An empirical study was next conducted to test the application of socio-
cognitive models of paranoid delusions to grandiose delusions.   
 
A systematic search of the literature was conducted on electronic academic databases 
between 1980 and 2012.  Seventeen studies that have utilised humorous tasks within 
explorations of either the comprehension and/or the appreciation of humorous stimuli 
were found. The literature suggests difficulties comprehending humour are clear in 
individuals with experiences of psychosis, and that this difficulty is augmented when 
there is a need to infer the mental states of others to understand jokes or humorous 
scenarios. However, the findings with respect to appreciation are less clear. Here the 
evidence points to the role of co-morbid mood symptoms such as depression and mania 
in the attenuation of humour appreciation.  
 
In the empirical study, a cross-sectional design was employed to compare the 
performance of individuals with grandiose delusions to a depressed control group on 
measures of Theory of Mind (ToM) and attributional style. Participants experiencing 
grandiose delusions performed significantly worse on both ToM tasks and produced 
significantly fewer references to mental states in a dialogue task. Following a symptom-
based approach, the presence of a grandiose delusion was significantly associated with 
poorer ToM on the joke appreciation and stories task. Participants with a grandiose 
delusion appear to have a ToM impairment independently of the severity of a comorbid 
persecutory delusion. Implications for clinical practice are also noted. 
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SECTION 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Humour Experiences in Psychosis: A Systematic Literature Review and Critique 
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Abstract 
Objectives. Poor social functioning is one of the more prominent characteristics of 
Schizophrenia and individuals experiencing psychosis have been reported to experience 
profound social impairment, social withdrawal, isolation and an inability to effectively 
communicate with others (Walker, Davis & Baum, 1993). This review explores humour 
experiences in this population.  
Methods. A systematic search of the literature was conducted on the electronic 
academic databases MEDLINE, ISI Web of Science, CINAHL, and PsycINFO between 
1980 and 2012.  
Results. Seventeen studies that have utilised humorous tasks within explorations of 
either the comprehension and/or the appreciation of humorous stimuli were found. 
Conclusions. The literature suggests difficulties comprehending humour are clear in 
individuals with experiences of psychosis, and that this difficulty is augmented when 
there is a need to infer the mental states of others to understand jokes or humorous 
scenarios. However, the findings with respect to appreciation are less clear. Here the 
evidence points to the role of co-morbid mood symptoms in the attenuation of humour 
appreciation. The inconsistency of the research findings in this area can be attributed to 
methodological differences between the studies. Several potential variables require 
further investigation to advance this important area. Implications for clinical practice are 
also noted. 
Keywords: humour, schizophrenia, psychosis, theory of mind, jokes 
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Humour Experiences in Psychosis: A Systematic Literature Review and Critique 
A good sense of humour is considered to be a positive trait bringing pleasure 
and enjoyment. Humour is considered to share elements with creativity (Ramachandran 
& Blakeslee, 1998) and enables the communication of ideas, feelings and opinions, 
while also enriching social relationships (Bronwell & Gardner, 1988). The ability to see 
the funny side of things has also been found to have measurable benefits on well-being 
(Martin, Phulick-Doris, Larsen, Gray & Weir, 2003) and to moderate the impact of 
various stressors on depression, pessimism, self-esteem and aggression (Nezu, Nezu & 
Blisset, 1988; Olson, Hugelshofer, Kwon & Reff, 2005; Thorson, Powell, Sarmany-
Schiller, & Hampes, 1998).   
The psychoanalytic perspective postulates humour consists of the sublimation of 
socially unacceptable themes, such as aggression and sex (Freud, 1938). Freud argued 
the appreciation of humour results from gratification and the release of tension and 
inhibited wishes which are associated with the theme of the humour. That is, hostile and 
sexual impulses are discharged under the socially acceptable cover of a joke. However, 
Freud believed that the expression of a socially disapproved view or wish is usually 
disguised or distorted in order to make it incongruous so that the individual does not 
have to take the impulse seriously.  Thus, humour can serve as a mechanism for coping 
with adverse situations and reducing tension and anxiety caused by disturbing issues 
(Gelkopf & Sigal, 1995). Humour can elevate social status by expressing superiority or 
saving face (Polimeni & Reiss, 2006) and it has even been linked to positive physical 
effects, such as boosting immune function (Bennet, Zeller, Rosenberg & McCann, 
2003). Hence, it is no surprise humour has been a topic for investigation by 
philosophers and scientists since Ancient Greece (Shelley, 2003). 
In recent years, humour has been explored in a variety of clinical groups. For 
instance, those with intellectual disabilities (Brown, 1994; Degabriele & Walsh, 2010), 
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alcohol problems (Uekermann, Channon, Winkel, Schelebusch, & Daum, 2006), bipolar 
disorder (Bozikas et al. 2007b), and depression and anxiety (DiMaggio et al. 2011). 
Since the work of Bleuler (1911) and Kraeplin (1883), affect and emotional disorder 
have been acknowledged as a central characteristic of psychosis. This is instantiated in 
the reports of poor self-esteem, anxiety, depressive and suicidal thoughts, traumatic 
experiences, anhedonia, social alienation and internalised stigma that characterise 
people with psychosis (Gelkopf, 2011). Poor social functioning is another of the more 
prominent characteristics of schizophrenia, with extreme social impairment, social 
withdrawal, isolation and an inability to effectively communicate with others being 
commonly reported (Walker, Davis & Baum, 1993). Given that humour is related to 
greater sociability and extraversion (Kuiper & Martin, 1993) the social impairment of 
this population could be associated with lower levels of humour. 
However, the literature has shown a link between creative thinking and the 
experience of psychosis, and a shared mechanism has been suggested. For instance, 
Hasenfus and Magaro (1976) and Marengo, Harrow and Edell (1993) have 
demonstrated associations between increased response competition and the tendency to 
think divergently and to generate unusual associations. Thus, it could be argued that 
some individuals experiencing psychosis may not show lower levels of humour than a 
nonclinical sample (Kuiper, Martin, Olinger, Kazarian, & Jette, 1998). Given that 
humour perception represents a specialised high-order cognitive ability which relies 
upon both intellectual and social proficiencies, Polimeni and Reiss (2006) argue humour 
could provide an excellent way to investigate the cognitive characteristics of 
schizophrenia at psychosocial, affective and neuroanatomical levels. Thus, this 
systematic review aims to answer the question ‗What do we know, from an evidence-
based perspective, about humour experiences in adults with psychosis?‘  
 
HUMOUR EXPERIENCES IN PSYCHOSIS  5 
Method 
Search Procedure 
A comprehensive electronic search (Figure 1) was conducted through the 
academic databases MEDLINE, ISI Web of Science, CINAHL, and PsycINFO. Google 
Scholar and the citation and reference lists from all identified studies were inspected for 
additional studies. Experts in the field were contacted for additional references and for 
any unpublished studies. The search included papers published in English between 1980 
and March 2012. The MeSH key search terms within article titles, abstracts and topics 
were: humo*r, joke*, funn* in one search set, ‗AND‘ with schizo*, psychos*, 
psychotic, bipolar disorder, manic depression in the second search set. Each term within 
each set was linked with the instruction ‗OR‘. A wildcard asterix was applied to search 
for related terms in some instances. Peer reviewed full text articles, reviews, and short 
communications were all considered for inclusion. The search was limited to articles 
written or translated into English, and excluded dissertation abstracts and conference 
presentations. 
Inclusion & Exclusion Criteria 
Studies were included if they: (1) adopted high level quality designs
1
 (2) 
provided quantitative data supported by appropriate statistical analyses (3) included a 
direct measure of visual and/or verbal humour appreciation or comprehension
2
, and (4) 
explored humour within participants recruited from a psychiatric population with a 
primary diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder or other 
psychoses within the schizophrenia spectrum as defined by the DSM-IV-R or ICD-10. 
                                                 
1
 This review sought level A or level B quality studies with regards to evidence as considered by the 
Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM, 2009) 
2
 Studies that explored responses to emotional stimuli that were not explicitly humorous were not 
included in the review. 
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Studies which used classification systems prior to the ICD-9 or DSMN-III (i.e. 1980) 
were excluded as these were considered outdated and unlikely to meet the last criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram of the selection of studies for review (adapted from: 
Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman & The PRISMA Group, 2010).  
Search terms/keywords used: humo*r, joke*,  funn*, schizo*, psychos*, psychotic, bipolar disorder 
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Quality Appraisal 
Two tools were utilised and adapted to produce a quality rating form (Appendix 
A). The first tool was an adapted version of the Health Evidence Bulletins Wales 
appraisal checklist (2004) which was based on sources such as the Critical Appraisal 
Skills Programme (CASP, 2006) questions. As it was anticipated that there would be 
few (if any) randomised controlled trials in this area, a second methodological scoring 
system that allowed nonrandomized studies to be evaluated was necessary.  
The Downs and Black tool (1998) is one of the most suitable tools for the 
assessment of methodological quality in cross-sectional studies (Jarde, Losilla & Vives, 
2012). This tool consists of the following sub-sections: Reporting, External 
Validity, Internal Validity (bias and confounding). Eleven of the original 
questions were omitted as they were not applicable to case-control or cross-
sectional designs (Appendix A). The last question was modified from a scale of 0 
to 5 to a binary score of 0 or 1 where 1 was only scored if a power calculation or 
explanation about the number of subjects required to test the hypotheses was 
provided.  Thus, the modified version of the tool (incorporating the Wales-
Bulletin questions) ranged from 0 to 20. Studies with a Quality Rating (QR) score of 
8/20 or below were considered to be of low methodological quality, 9-15 of moderate 
quality, and scores of 16 and above were considered good quality.  
Reliability of Quality Ratings 
After studies were ranked according to the above criteria, six studies were 
chosen at random (two from the bottom and top quartiles and two from the middle). 
These studies were then independently rated by a second reviewer according to the 
agreed criteria. The ratings were shared and where conclusions over the quality of a 
study differed, the study was reviewed jointly and discussed. The Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient (ICC; ρ = 0.98) for inter-rater agreement was excellent (Fleiss, 1981). 
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Results 
The original search strategy identified 555 papers
3
. The first author assessed 
every abstract identified by the electronic search for relevance to this review and 
excluded duplicates. Of these, 411 papers were considered irrelevant and excluded. 
After the first screening, the inclusion and exclusion criteria were manually applied to 
the remaining 144 potentially relevant papers, resulting in 127 papers being excluded 
and 17 papers included in this review.  
Table 1 provides an overview of each study, presented in order of quality ratings 
derived from the appraisal tool. One study (Falkenberg, 2007) achieved a quality rating 
of under 9, deeming it to be of poor quality (Appendix B). This study was a brief report, 
and due to limited detail the study could not be critiqued or considered eligible for 
inclusion within this review. Three studies achieved a high quality rating (Henry et al., 
2007; Gavilan & Garcia-Albea, 2011; Polimeni, Campbell, Gill, Breanna, & Reiss, 
2010). Key merits of these studies included excellent reporting of detail, high internal 
and external validity, demonstration of a moderate to high effect size and results that 
can be generalised to the wider population. Furthermore, these studies recruited patients 
and controls from the same sample population (i.e. from one clinical service only) and 
took into account important confounding variables such as medication, participant 
symptomatology and an assessment of pre-morbid intelligence. 
The structure of this review 
In this review, researchers attempt to explain humour from a cognitive (comprehension 
and recognition of humour), affective (appreciation), and/or neurobiological (functional 
areas of the brain in humour processing) approach. 
                                                 
3
 These searches, along with a search of the Cochrane Library for Systematic Reviews using the terms 
‗humour‘, ‗schizophrenia‘, ‗bipolar disorder‘, and ‗psychosis‘, revealed no similar systematic review had 
previously been published using these terms. 
          
Table 1. 
Summary of the evidence for humour appreciation and comprehension deficits in psychosis in order of quality ratings 
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
characteristics (n) 
 
Humour task 
 
Additional measures 
 
Comprehension 
deficit? 
 
Appreciation 
deficit? 
 
 
Other findings 
 
 
QR 
Gavilan & 
Garcia-
Albea 
(2011) 
 
Schizophrenia (22) 
Non-clinical 
controls (22) 
ToM cartoons 6 language 
comprehension tasks, 2 
ToM tasks, PANNS, 
WAIS III subtests 
 
  Humour task significantly correlated with basic 
language comprehension and comprehension of 
figurative language. 
18 
Henry et 
al. (2007) 
 
Schizophrenia (29) 
Non-clinical 
controls (30) 
3 humorous video clips. 
Participants asked to 
amplify or suppress 
their emotional 
responses and to rate 
the extent to which they 
experienced 10 specific 
emotions (including 
amusement) 
SAPS, SANS, WASI-4 
subtests 
  The experimental group demonstrated difficulties 
with the amplification of emotion. These 
difficulties were significantly correlated with 
emotional blunting. The subjective experience of 
affect did not differ for either condition. 
18 
Polimeni 
et al. 
(2010) 
 
Schizophrenia (20) 
Psychiatric controls 
(30) 
Non-clinical 
controls (20) 
64 cartoons with 
captions  
 
Battery of cognitive 
tests, SASS, NART, 
WAIS III 
Comprehension, WCST-
CC 
 
  Humour comprehension positively correlated with 
IQ social reasoning, executive functioning, and 
social adjustment. 
17 
          
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
characteristics (n) 
 
Humour task 
 
Additional measures 
 
Comprehension 
deficit? 
 
Appreciation 
deficit? 
 
 
Other findings 
 
 
QR 
Kuiper et 
al. (1998) 
 
 
Non-paranoid 
Schizophrenia (24) 
Depressed 
sample(32) 
Non-clinical 
sample (100) 
SHRQ, SHQ, CHS 
 
Self-concept measures 
and 2 affect/mood 
measures.  
  The schizophrenia group scored significantly 
lower than the nonclinical sample on the SHRQ 
and SHQ-LH. No relationship between humour 
ratings and self-concept or self-esteem in 
schizophrenia group.  
16 
Corcoran, 
Cahill & 
Frith 
(1997) 
 
Schizophrenia (44) 
Psychiatric group 
(non-psychotic) (7) 
Non-clinical 
controls (40) 
Two sets of 10 cartoon 
jokes (physical or 
ToM). Seven false 
belief jokes, and three 
deception-based 
scenarios. 
Ammons & Ammons, 
PSE 
  The schizophrenia group found mental state 
jokes significantly more difficult to understand. 
This effect was most marked in patients with 
behavioural signs. Those with paranoid delusions 
also struggled to appreciate mental state stimuli. 
15 
Langdon, 
Ward & 
Coltheart 
(2010) 
Schizophrenia/ 
Schizoaffective 
(35) 
Non-clinical 
controls (34) 
ToM cartoon joke 
appreciation task 
PDI, PS, NART, HDS, 
WMS-LMI, LMII, 2 
versions of the ―beads 
task‖, IPSAQ and two 
additional ToM Tasks.  
  Patients showed a jumping-to-conclusions bias, 
excessive externalising bias, and performance 
deficit on all three ToM tasks. Total ToM 
correlated with probabilistic reasoning proneness 
and both these correlated with delusional ideation.  
15 
Langdon 
& Ward 
(2009) 
 
Schizophrenia/Schi
zoaffective (30) 
Non-clinical 
controls (26) 
ToM joke appreciation 
task 
  
 
NART, PANNS, 
verbal memory, 
two additional 
ToM tasks 
 
  ToM scores from picture sequencing and joke 
tasks correlated significantly in schizophrenia 
group and predicted insight.  
15 
          
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
characteristics (n) 
 
Humour task 
 
Additional measures 
 
Comprehension 
deficit? 
 
Appreciation 
deficit? 
 
 
Other findings 
 
 
QR 
Marjoram 
et al. 
(2005) 
 
Schizophrenia (20) 
Non-clinical 
controls (20) 
ToM and physical 
cartoon jokes 
Krawiecka scale, 
Ammons & Ammons 
 
  Individuals with Schizophrenia performed 
significantly worse than controls in both 
conditions, but most marked in ToM condition.  
15 
Marjoram 
et al. 
(2006) 
 
First degree 
relatives of people 
with Schizophrenia 
(42) 
Schizophrenia (5) 
Non-clinical 
controls (13) 
Three sets of cartoon 
jokes (ToM, scrambled 
or physical). 
PSE, fMRI scans.   Tasks activated the PFC, precuneus and temporal 
lobes. The results indicate a state effect evident in 
ToM processing in those at high risk of 
schizophrenia. Those with symptoms on testing or 
a diagnosis activated more frontal regions. 
14 
Stratta et 
al. (2007) 
 
Schizophrenia (20) 32 irony visual physical 
jokes and 32 ToM irony 
jokes.  
PANSS, NART (Italian 
version) 
  Significant relationship between ToM and 
PANSS positive and cognitive symptoms but not 
negative symptom scores. Humour significantly 
correlated with positive symptoms. IQ correlated 
with humour scores for both sets of jokes and 
inspection time for ToM cartoons.  
14 
Tsoi et al. 
(2008) 
Schizophrenia (30) 
Non-clinical 
controls (30) 
Four silent comedy film 
clips.  
ToM, WCST, LSP, 
NART, BDI, CDSS, 
SANS, SAPS, PANAS. 
  Patients with Schizophrenia were less able to 
detect humour but similarly able to appreciate it. 
The degree of humour recognition difficulty may 
reflect a deficit in the executive function. 
14 
          
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
characteristics (n) 
 
Humour task 
 
Additional measures 
 
Comprehension 
deficit? 
 
Appreciation 
deficit? 
 
 
Other findings 
 
 
QR 
Bozikas et 
al. (2007a) 
Schizophrenia (36) 
Non-clinical 
controls (31) 
PHAT  
 
PANNS, cognitive 
symptoms, depression, 
excitement, executive 
function, attention, 
working memory, verbal 
and visual memory, 
visuospatial ability, 
psychomotor speed, 
abstract/flexible 
thinking, verbal fluency, 
auditory attention, 
sustained attention, 
visual scanning. 
 
  Findings suggested deficits in humour 
appreciation could be due to poor selective and 
sustained attention and word fluency. 
13 
Polimeni 
& Reiss 
(2006) 
 
Schizophrenia (23) 
Non-clinical 
controls (20) 
Humour perception 
test: 128 single-caption 
cartoons either original 
or altered to eliminate 
humour.  
MMSE, PANSS   Patients demonstrated a deficit in humour 
perception compared to controls 
13 
Bozikas et 
al. (2007b) 
Bipolar disorder (8) 
Non-clinical 
controls (22) 
PHAT YMRS, MDRS   No significant differences between groups. The 
scores did not correlate with residual symptoms 
(mania or depression). 
12 
Juckel et 
al. (2008)  
  
 
Schizophrenia (21) 
 Non-clinical 
controls (30) 
Kinematic analysis of 
facial movement in 
response to humorous 
film stimuli ("Mr. 
Bean" clips). 
Participants also rated 
funniness 
SANS, BPRS, measure 
of voluntary facial 
activity 
 / Unmedicated patients showed a significant higher 
initial velocity of laughter than controls. Patients 
on typical neuroleptics showed lower rates of 
initial velocity. Positive correlations were found 
between severity of negative symptoms and initial 
velocity. No differences were found on funniness 
ratings compared to controls. 
11 
          
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
characteristics (n) 
 
Humour task 
 
Additional measures 
 
Comprehension 
deficit? 
 
Appreciation 
deficit? 
 
 
Other findings 
 
 
QR 
Juckel & 
Polzer 
(1998) 
Schizophrenia (7) 
Non-clinical 
controls (7) 
Humorous movie    Patients exhibited a faster speed of 
movement in the left and right corner of the 
mouth when starting to laugh at the 
stimulus. 
9 
Note. BDI=Beck‘s Depression Inventory, BPRS=Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, CDSS=The Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia, CES-D=Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale, CHS=Coping Humour Scale, fMRIi=Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, HDS=Hamilton Depression Scale, IPSAQ=Internal, Personal and 
Situational Attributions Questionnaire, LSP=Life Skills Profile, MMSE=Mini Mental State Examination, MDRS=Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale, NART=National 
Adult Reading Test, PANAS=The Positive and Negative Affect Scale, PDI=Peters Delusion Inventory, PSE=Present State Examination, PS=Paranoia Scale, RSEI=Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Inventory, SANS=Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms, SAPS=Schedule for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms, SASS=Social Adjustment Scale Self-Report, 
SHQ=The Sense of Humour Questionnaire, SHRQ=Situational Humour Response Questionnaire, ToM=Theory of Mind, YMRS=Young Mania Rating Scale, WAIS=Wechshler 
Adult Intelligence Scale, WCST=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, WMS-LMI=Wechsler Memory Scale Logical Memories Index 
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Thus, after reviewing the characteristics of these studies, the review will focus on these 
three perspectives.  
Study characteristics 
The majority of studies were conducted in the UK (n = 4), Australia (n = 3) and 
Canada (n = 3), with the rest of the studies having been conducted in other European 
countries (n = 7). Thus, cultural differences must be considered carefully when 
comparing the results of these studies given that little is known about humour across 
different Western culture groups (Carbelo-Baquero, Alonso-Rodriguez, Valero-Garces, 
& Thorson, 2006). The total number of participants included in the studies was 930. 
Experimental group sample sizes ranged from n = 7 to n = 45. The majority of studies 
were non-randomised case-control designs (n = 16) and one study employed a cross-
sectional design.  
Reliability and validity. Patients may not detect humour or appreciate humour 
as intensely as they might because of the effects of a range of symptoms such as 
depression. One solution is to measure these symptoms and control for them 
statistically, and another is to include a non-psychotic psychiatric control group to 
ensure that any diminished results in people with psychosis are specific to the diagnosis 
or the symptoms of psychosis. Only three of the 16 studies employed a psychiatric 
control group in order to distinguish whether deficits in humour appreciation or 
expression were related to psychotic symptomatology or diagnosis alone. Several 
studies had small sample sizes (Stratta et al., 2007; Polimeni & Reiss, 2006; Marjoram 
et al., 2005) or failed to recruit a control group at all (Stratta et al., 2007). A number of 
studies used unstandardised measures with no psychometric details available and failed 
to make explicit reference to the effect size of the measures. However, to improve the 
reliability of these measures, researchers have ensured the use of additional raters in 
their design to reduce bias (Henry et al., 2007; Juckel et al., 2008).  
HUMOUR EXPERIENCES IN PSYCHOSIS   15 
As seen in Table 1, researchers have used a variety of methods to measure the 
appreciation and comprehension of humorous stimuli. Given the variation in methods 
employed to explore humour, it is difficult to infer whether differences in 
comprehension or type of response stem from the type of humour stimuli. Corcoran 
(2008) advocates the selection of stimuli in experiments investigating humour should 
attempt to maximise ecological validity while taking into account any language 
processing or information integrating difficulties associated with psychosis. However, 
while everyday experiences of mirth are characterised by the integration of verbal and 
visual information, thirteen studies employed a non-verbal cartoon task to portray a 
humorous scene or conversation between characters. This may have become the method 
of choice because it is a task that is short, enjoyable, and undemanding of other 
cognitive skills such as high levels of sustained attention and memory and is not 
confounded by verbal ability (Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997).  
Several studies (Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997; Langdon & Ward, 2009; 
Langdon, Ward & Coltheart, 2010; Marjoram et al., 2005; 2006; Stratta et al., 2007) 
used cartoons requiring theory of mind (ToM) where the joke can be ‗got‘ by inferring 
the mental state(s) of the character(s), which were administered alongside control 
cartoons of a physical/slapstick nature for improved reliability. However, the use of 
cartoons in any laboratory study wishing to explore cognitive and affective reactions to 
social scenarios is extremely limited by poor ecological validity. With these measures 
participants are asked to explain the joke, which the researcher subjectively assesses for 
level of understanding according to their own criteria. Given that it is unlikely the 
researcher is ‗blind‘ to the group the participant belongs to there is a risk of bias in these 
measures. Bias in scoring can also work in the other direction. For example, in studies 
using film clips (e.g. Tsoi et al., 2008) the fact that it is generally known these are 
intended to be funny alert participants to the researcher‘s expectations (Corcoran, 2008). 
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This potential bias becomes particularly problematic if familiar comedy clips (such as 
Mr Bean) are employed or if studies adopt the use of video clips where the audience 
laughter has not been silenced (Henry et al., 2007; Juckel et al., 1997; Juckel & Polzer, 
1998). 
Humour Comprehension 
Nine of the seventeen studies in this review explored the identification of 
humour, of which all found significant deficits in humour recognition and 
comprehension in individuals with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia in contrast to a non-
clinical sample (Corcoran et al., 1997; Langdon & Ward, 2009; Langdon et al., 2010; 
Majoram et al., 2005; 2006; Polimeni & Reiss, 2006; Polimeni et al., 2010; Stratta et al., 
2010; Tsoi et al., 2008). 
ToM and humour. Seven of the reviewed studies utilised a ToM task which 
involved humorous stimuli or assessed ToM as an additional measure. The role of ToM 
in humour perception is based upon the work of Corcoran et al. (1997) who suggest 
jokes are likely to require two stages of processing before their intention becomes clear. 
Firstly, it must be appreciated that the joke is intended to be funny (‗the general 
intentional inference‘). This knowledge enables the individual to persevere with jokes 
not immediately understood. Secondly, it must be inferred from a joke what is supposed 
to be funny and why it is funny (‗the specific intentional inference‘). Corcoran et al. 
(1997) argue both stages require the social cognitive skill of inferring mental states 
(ToM). The second stage in particular requires online mentalizing in order to draw from 
the intention of others in humorous scenarios. However, should a failure at the stage of 
general intentional inference occur, appreciation at stage two is likely to be 
compromised and would imply a deficient store of social semantic information or a 
difficulty retrieving information from the social semantic store (e.g. Corcoran & Frith, 
1996).  
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Corcoran et al. (1997) allocated those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
hierarchically to one of four groups based upon symptomatology according to Frith‘s 
(1992) metarepresentional theory of schizophrenia. Those with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia performed worse on the ToM task than a non-clinical control group, with 
those experiencing behavioural disorders and passivity symptoms performing most 
poorly. However, patients with negative symptoms or disorganization symptoms 
demonstrated difficulty regardless of whether or not the jokes required mental 
inferences. No difference was found in those without symptoms, although there was a 
tendency for a second depressed control group to find the ToM jokes more difficult to 
understand, suggesting the deficit is not exclusive to schizophrenia. However, this 
group was small (n = 7) and replication of this finding would be necessary to support 
this argument further.  
Using a larger battery of cartoon jokes, Marjoram et al. (2005) found similar 
results - but not in relation to the subjective appreciation of the jokes. They 
hypothesised ToM deficits may not be specific to the diagnosis of schizophrenia but 
rather to the positive symptoms of psychoses (delusions and hallucinations). However, 
this was not supported by their findings, perhaps due to a small sample size. It would 
have been useful to include a measure of cognitive impairment (i.e. working memory, 
executive functioning) to explore whether the deficit was specific or secondary to the 
ToM impairment. No significant differences in response time to both sets of jokes, and 
no differences of subjective ratings of difficulty or humour were found. Participants 
may therefore have found something entirely different equally as humorous within the 
stimuli. Alternatively, given the participants reported both sets of jokes as equally 
difficult, it may be that they were providing socially desirable answers for the subjective 
ratings of humour to the researcher, but finding  they could not then explain the jokes 
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clearly. The latter may be the most plausible explanation, given the participants were 
primed by the researcher that the jokes were intended to be funny.   
This study was replicated by Stratta et al. (2007) who also found patients 
performed more poorly on the ToM jokes than the physical jokes. Patients also reported 
the ToM jokes to be less funny and difficult than the physical jokes, yet gave more 
correct responses to these. The authors suggest the patients possibly struggled to engage 
the cognitive resources (such as attention) to work out the irony/incongruity behind 
these cartoons. However, the study did not employ a control group. The authors also 
found those with a higher IQ achieved a higher comprehension score yet spent more 
time analysing the cartoon before providing a response (again, suggesting they were 
engaging cognitive resources). Other findings revealed the more psychotic and 
cognitive symptoms (measured by the PANNS; Kay, Fizsbein & Opler, 1987) the less 
funny the joke was found to be. Thus, the authors concluded that compromised ToM is 
linked to severity of illness.  
More recently, Gavilan and Garcia-Albea (2011) found patients performed 
significantly worse on understanding cartoon jokes, but no significant differences were 
found between the false-belief (those requiring mental states) and non-false belief (FB) 
cartoons. The patients‘ performance on the cartoons (followed by two other FB ToM 
tasks, ironies, metaphors and a proverbs task) was found to be the best predictor in 
discriminating patients from controls. Although the small sample size did not allow for 
investigation of schizophrenia subtypes, these findings suggest the ToM element of the 
jokes task presented particular difficulties for the people with schizophrenia. Langdon 
and Ward (2008) also found differences between patients with schizophrenia and 
controls on the comprehension of ToM (but not physical) jokes. However, they argue 
not all ToM tasks tap the unitary underlying concept to the same extent. They found 
patients performed significantly poorer on three different ToM tasks compared to 
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controls, regardless of IQ or memory scores. Only the joke and picture sequencing ToM 
tasks (not the story comprehension task) scores moderately intercorrelated reliably in 
patients and predicted levels of insight. The authors argue this may be down to whether 
direct instructions are given, which cue awareness of the relevance of mental states. 
Thus, better ToM may enable the individual to imagine what it would be like to think 
what another person is thinking, but these patients would then need to accept that the 
other perspective is the more accurate representation of a true state of affairs – a 
cognitive step which could be difficult for people who are motivated to avoid negative 
self-reflection. Unfortunately however, this study did not explore symptomology (e.g. 
delusional beliefs) to support this argument further.  
Recognition. Where several studies explored the role of ToM in humour 
comprehension, another set of studies investigated the ability to recognise humour in 
patients experiencing psychosis. Polimeni and Reiss (2006) argue that one can get a 
joke without being able to explain it. In other words, consistent with Corcoran et al.‘s 
(1997) general intentional inference, even without a laughter response, people are 
generally aware when others are attempting to be funny. To test the recognition of 
humour, they devised a verbal humour perception test which asked participants to 
identify which of 128 cartoons were shown with their original caption, and which were 
shown with a caption that belonged to a different cartoon and did not make sense. 
Significant deficits were found in patients compared to a matched control group. 
Polimeni and colleagues (2010) replicated their findings in a later study using the same 
humour task. They also administered a battery of wide-ranging cognitive tests and 
social functioning scales to identify any salient cognitive components underlying this 
impairment. Significant deficits in humour recognition were again shown by people 
with schizophrenia compared to psychiatric and non-clinical controls. The deficits were 
positively correlated with general intellectual functioning, executive functioning, social 
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reasoning and social adjustment ratings. Although this was a novel test of the general 
versus the specific intentional inference as identified by Corcoran et al. (1997), the 
study would have been improved if the potential effects of other covariates such as 
symptomology, cognitive ability, medication, mood, or language skills had been 
accounted for in the analysis. 
Tsoi et al. (2008) employed a different modality of humorous stimuli (Mr Bean 
video clips), and hypothesized the ability to experience humour would be associated 
with patients‘ social functioning and executive function. Compared to controls, the 
patients were less sensitive at detecting humour after controlling for baseline 
performance on a recognition task. There were significant, although moderate, negative 
associations between recognition and delusions, depression, apathy and avolition. The 
ability to identify humour correlated negatively with delusion and depression scores, 
and with the preservative error score of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; 
Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993) which suggests a role for executive 
functions. Similarly to the findings of Polimeni et al. (2010), the authors suggest this 
may contribute to psychosocial impairment, as shown by the negative correlation with 
the total scores of the Life Skills Profile (LSP; Rosen, Hadzi-Pavlovic, & Parker., 
1989). However, the selection of only one ToM and one executive functioning task 
(WCST) did not allow for a deeper understanding of their investigation of Martin‘s 
(2006) theory, who posits mental schemas enable us to make sense of incoming 
information from humorous situations. However, should the information from the 
situation not fit with this schema, we search for an alternative schema that matches, 
allowing for an alternative interpretation of the situation. If this second schema is 
invoked simultaneously with the initial schema, then humour results. Therefore, 
simultaneous activation of two incompatible schemata is the essence of incongruity in 
humour. Corcoran (2008) argues additional measures of working memory would have 
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strengthened their argument as Martin‘s (2006) schema theory would imply a direct 
correlation between ToM performance and humour appreciation as the need to hold two 
things in mind are a common feature of ToM tests. Given the understanding these were 
intended to be funny, the video clips required little cognitive processing and, as argued 
by Corcoran (2008), they are not best suited to establish a relationship between ToM 
and the nature of humour appreciation as they invoked slapstick humour. Tsoi et al. 
(2008) did however ensure that the clips were played in silence to hide the canned 
laughter which may have indicated a moment was experienced as funny by others. They 
also asked participants to indicate whether they had seen the clips before, finding their 
results remained the same after controlling for differences in familiarity. As these clips 
did not include speech these stimuli did not allow for an exploration of language, 
thereby reducing ecological validity (Lee, Tsoi & Woodruff, 2009).  
Bozikas et al. (2007a) administered the PHAT, a computerised task depicting 20 
captionless identical pairs of cartoons. Participants identified which of the pair was 
intended to be funny or to indicate if both were equally funny. Significant differences in 
PHAT scores were found between the groups. After applying a Bonferri correction, 
significant associations were found between these scores and performance on word 
fluency and selective and sustained attention. This association was considered to reflect 
the need to process anomalous detail in order to detect the intended humour. Similar to 
Corcoran et al. (1997), they also found an association with symptomology. The authors 
replicated this study with patients with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder in remission 
(Bozikas et al., 2007b). Although the patients performed poorly in comparison to 
controls, the difference was not significant. The patients‘ performance did not relate to 
either mania or depression. However, it is possible the results would have reached 
significance had the patients been symptomatic. 
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Humour appreciation 
This review demonstrates that there are clear difficulties in the comprehension 
and recognition of humour in patients with psychosis. However, it appears the results 
for humour appreciation in adults experiencing psychosis are less equivocal. The ability 
to enjoy humorous stimuli is not necessarily the same as the ability to comprehend the 
point of the joke. In fact, what can differ is the emotional impact that the theme of the 
humorous stimulus has upon the individual. Given that mood and emotional 
disturbances are common characteristics in adults with schizophrenia (Juckel & Polzer, 
1998) this is a key area of interest for researchers who wish to explore affective 
differences within the context of psychotic experiences. Out of the ten studies which 
included a measurement of humour appreciation, six studies found significant 
differences between the experimental sample and non-clinical controls (Gavilan & 
Garcia-Albea, 2011; Kuiper et al., 1998; Bozikas et al., 2007a; Juckel & Polzer, 1998; 
Juckel et al., 2008; Stratta et al., 2007) whereas four did not (Bozikas et al., 2007b; 
Henry et al., 2007; Marjoram et al., 2005; 2006; Tsoi et al., 2007).  
Kuiper et al. (1998) found those with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia and those 
with depression performed significantly worse than a nonclinical group on four 
measures
4
 of humour. The schizophrenic inpatients showed only slightly lower levels of 
humour than the nonclinical comparison group, but failed to show a relationship 
between sense of humour, self-concept and psychological well-being.  Furthermore, 
participants with schizophrenia scored significantly lower on the Situational Humour 
Response Questionnaire (Lefcourt & Martin, 1986) and the personal liking of humour 
                                                 
4
 Sense of Humor Questionnaire (SHQ; Sveback, 1974), Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegren, 1988), Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1979), an adjective 
self-rating task (Kuiper & Martin, 1993) and the Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
(CEDS; Radloff, 1977).   
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subscale of the SHQ which assesses the degree to which an individual values the 
humorous role. 
Facial activity has been reported to be reduced in schizophrenia and depression 
with or without medication (Schneider et al., 1992). However, Henry et al. (2007) found 
both patients and non-clinical controls can effectively implement the strategy of 
suppressing emotional behavior in response to three amusing film clips. However, only 
the control group was able to exaggerate their behavioural response. Behavioural 
expression was significantly correlated with the degree of emotional blunting; 
supporting the hypothesis that emotional dysregulation may be a potential mechanism 
underpinning this common characteristic of schizophrenia.  
Juckel and Polzer (1998) found significant differences in the speed of facial 
movement when beginning to laugh at a humorous film. Unfortunately, the authors 
recruited only seven participants in both the experimental and control groups, and did 
not explore IQ, symptomatology, or neuroleptic medication as potential confounding 
explanations for these differences.  However, in a later study, Juckel et al. (2008) used 
kinematic facial behaviour analysis using a short Mr Bean film to induce amusement. 
Patients were found to react with laughter significantly later, and they reached 
maximum laughing behaviour another 0.7 seconds later. They were also observed to 
laugh significantly less than controls. The researchers also explored differences between 
unmedicated patients and those in receipt of neuroleptics, finding those taking 
antipsychotics and Biperiden for extra pyramidal symptoms showed a distinctly slower 
initial laughing speed than controls, whereas those on atypical antipsychotics showed a 
similar initial velocity (IV) of laughing. Significant correlations between IV and 
anxiety, depression and the brief psychiatric rating score (BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 
1962) were observed. Positive correlations were also found between IV and affect 
scores and to a lesser extent with poverty of speech and attention. Interestingly, 
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emotional reaction time and IV were found to be independent and the patients showed 
an abnormally low laughing frequency and delay in facial reaction to the clips. Yet, 
their facial reactions were significantly faster than controls, and when asked to evaluate 
how funny the sketch was on a visual analogue scale, patients rated the film as having 
the same emotional impact as the controls. This highlights facial expressions do not 
necessarily implicate a diminished affective response to humour. 
The neurobiological perspective 
Neuroimaging studies have been conducted with a variety of clinical groups, 
which have found supportive evidence that the frontal lobes and limbic system 
structures are important parts of humour appreciation (Gallagher et al., 2000). Patients 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia have shown deficits in the neuroanatomical areas 
(Walter et al., 2003) and multiple domains of cognition involved with humour 
appreciation (Palmer & Heaton, 2000; Pantelis & Maruff, 2002). However, to date only 
one study has explored the activations of neural circuits in the brain in response to 
humorous stimuli in people at risk of schizophrenia. Marjoram et al. (2006) conducted 
an fMRI study with relatives at either low or high risk of schizophrenia (depending on 
whether they had first or second degree relatives with the diagnosis), non-clinical 
controls, and a small group of participants who were given a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
during the timespan of the study. Those who were at high risk of developing 
schizophrenia were also analysed in two groups; those who had never previously 
reported symptoms, and those who had reported psychotic symptoms at least once 
before during a larger study they were recruited from. These participants (n = 12) were 
further divided in two halves based on past or present psychotic symptoms. 
The study found robust activations across the groups in the areas previously 
associated with mentalising abilities (PFC, precuneus and temporal lobes). Participants 
without symptoms showed significantly more activation in the frontal lobe areas than 
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those with symptoms or a diagnosis of schizophrenia. No differences in difficulty 
ratings or the comprehension of the jokes were found which may have been due to the 
relatives being more at risk but not currently experiencing the array of symptoms 
commonly found with schizophrenia. However, those with previous symptoms were 
significantly quicker at understanding the joke than those with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and those with symptoms on the day of testing, suggesting that cognitive 
skills were involved here. However, given the areas involved in mentalising were 
activated as well as those involved in humour processing, it is difficult to conclude that 
the ToM activations were due to the individual‘s attempt to understand the character in 
the cartoons or due to the attempt to get at what the artist was trying to portray as a joke. 
Furthermore, the researchers did not investigate the appreciation of these jokes 
(funniness ratings) which would have allowed for interesting correlational analyses. The 
secondary analyses of this study must also be interpreted with caution given the small 
sample sizes within each subgroup.  
The majority of studies included in this review measured estimates of IQ to 
ensure humour recognition deficits were not attributable to overall neurocognitive 
functioning (Corcoran et al., 1997; Langdon et al., 2010; Langdon & Ward, 2009; Tsoi 
et al., 2008; Marjoram et al., 2005). These studies found the performance of the patient 
groups was independent of intelligence, whereas Henry et al. (2007) failed to control for 
IQ in their statistical analysis. Only one study found a significant positive correlation 
between humour recognition and general intelligence (Polimeni et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, Stratta et al. (2007) found that patients displaying more cognitive 
symptoms found ToM jokes less difficult. The authors query whether this unexpected 
finding was caused by patients not spending the time to recruit cognitive resources to 
comprehend the jokes as measured by the time spent exploring the pictures presented. 
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Similar results were found by Marjoram et al. (2005a), where controls spent more time 
on the ToM cartoons than patients. 
  From the studies included in this review, it certainly appears that performance 
on humour recognition tasks have shown associations with a range of neurocognitive 
skills, such as selective and sustained attention (Bozikas et al., 2007a), executive 
functioning, social reasoning and social adjustment (Polimeni et al., 2010), working 
memory (Tsoi et al., 2008), verbal memory and inhibitory control (Langdon & Ward, 
2009) and in some cases, general intellectual functioning (Polimeni et al., 2009). A 
number of studies in this review have explored the relationship between language and 
humour comprehension and appreciation, revealing limited and mixed evidence that 
people with psychosis have difficulties in comprehending jokes due to language 
difficulties. Patients with psychosis have been shown to have diminished ability to 
understand language (Stephane, Pellizzer, Fletcher, & McClannahan, 2007), particularly 
pragmatic language like metaphors and irony which are commonly used in language-
based humour. Several studies administered a quick IQ test (e.g. NART; Nelson, 1982) 
which are beneficial because they measure verbal extraction abilities. Bozikas et al. 
(2007a) included phonemic and semantic language fluency as covariates within their 
analysis, finding only phonemic language was related to humour appreciation. 
Galivan and Garcia-Albea (2011) found ToM impairments seem to be mainly 
associated with language comprehension at the semantic-pragmatic processing level, 
and that this ToM association with language comprehension was for the most part 
independent of IQ. In Langdon and Ward‘s study (2008), the number of words produced 
proved to be a clear significant predictor of ToM. They found patients with 
schizophrenia had greater difficulty in explaining the humour behind the ToM jokes, 
which may suggest they have difficulty verbalising the mental states of others. The 
authors also reported that the more words generated in their explanations of jokes and 
HUMOUR EXPERIENCES IN PSYCHOSIS   27 
the better the patients‘ verbal comprehension and memory, the higher the joke 
appreciation score tended to be. However, as the ToM difficulty remained even when 
verbal comprehension scores were controlled for, this argument is not strong. With 
these types of measures it is difficult to know whether participants did not recognise the 
mental state of characters or chose not to explain the joke in more detail. Nonetheless, 
the purpose of these tasks is to see whether participants can voluntarily make inference 
in social situations where there is no prompt to examine the mental states of others. 
Discussion 
There is a growing consensus that psychosis can be more gainfully studied by 
exploring the meaning of its individual symptoms (Bentall, 2003). This symptom 
focused approach has included an exploration of social skills, such as humour, 
associated with symptoms of schizophrenia. The balance of the current evidence 
suggests there are difficulties in the comprehension of humour in adults with psychosis. 
Nine studies explored the identification of humour, of which all found significant 
deficits in humour recognition and comprehension. Corcoran et al. (1997), Marjoram et 
al. (2005), Gavilan and Garcia-Albea (2011) and Langdon and colleagues (2008; 2010) 
conclude patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia generally have difficulty 
appreciating humour in cartoons, but this problem is augmented when they must first 
infer the mental state of another person. The studies that focused on mental state versus 
physical cartoon jokes all achieved a high quality rating of over 14, suggesting these 
findings are reliable.   
For appreciation however, the results are less clear. Of the ten studies that 
investigated humour appreciation, six found significant differences between the 
experimental sample and non-clinical controls. Studies exploring mirth were much more 
varied in terms of both the conclusions given regarding humour appreciation, and in the 
ratings achieved for their methodological quality. The causes of a deficit in humour 
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appreciation are not known but the literature makes a number of suggestions. For 
instance, it is possible that these patients with psychosis are prone to depression, which 
in turn may increase feelings of anhedonia. Additional symptoms that may relate to 
humour in these patients include blunting of affect, inappropriate or flat affect (Kuiper 
et al., 1998) and cognitive deficits which impact heavily upon the individual‘s ability to 
recognize and understand humour.  
Only one study has explored the neuroanatomy of humour processing in the 
context of psychosis (Marjoram et al. 2005). However, this study primarily focused on 
relatives of individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Nonetheless, individuals with 
previous symptoms were significantly quicker to understand the joke than those with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and those with symptoms on the day of testing, suggesting 
there may be a state effect mediated by traits in ToM processing in those at high risk of 
schizophrenia. However, additional studies with larger samples of adults‘ currently 
experiencing psychosis are necessary to provide further clarification of these findings. 
Implications for Future Research 
Only four studies in this review measured both comprehension and appreciation, 
of which three (Marjoram et al. 2005; 2006, Tsoi et al., 2008) found deficits in 
comprehension but not in appreciation. Although it seems that humour comprehension 
impairment is apparent in psychosis, regardless of ToM performance, there appears to 
be something specific about these tasks that patients with psychosis struggle to 
comprehend. There are three possible responses that any individual could show when 
processing stimuli which have the intention to give rise to mirth. The first is 
understanding a joke in the way it was intended to be understood and consequently 
rating it as funny. The second, is not understanding the intention behind the joke, and 
therefore not rating it as particularly humorous. The third response, which may be more 
specific to individuals experiencing psychotic symptoms, is to find the joke funny but 
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for reasons not considered ‗typical‘ or do not reflect the true intention of the cartoonist. 
Such an idiosyncratic response could be attributed to a misconception of the aims 
behind the joke, a defensive strategy (i.e. keeping face) or could perhaps be put down to 
a creative alternative explanation for the joke. Corcoran‘s (2008) commentary on Tsoi 
et al‘s (2008) study suggests an interesting aspect; if the patients and controls do not 
recognise similar aspects of the stimuli as humorous, it may be they find different 
aspects funny to the same degree. Thus, qualitative explanations of a joke are of interest 
when conducting this type of research, for instance qualitative differences between the 
groups that are attributable to unusual beliefs or auditory, delusional or hallucinatory 
symptoms. With this in mind, the inclusion of mental state terminology within a 
quantitative analysis of joke interpretation is valuable here. Although there is not one 
correct answer, participants do usually draw on the same elements of the joke to arrive 
at the conclusion as to why the joke is funny. Asking patients to explain the joke allows 
an evaluation of the extent to which they generate ‗typical explanations‘.   
It would also be interesting to study humour in varying mood states. Fifteen of 
the participants with schizophrenia in Langdon et al.‘s study (2008) reported 
experiencing persecutory delusions, of which 13 also reported grandiose delusions. 
Mania and/or high levels of grandiosity are commonly reported by individuals with 
psychosis and bipolar disorder, but only one study has explored the humour experience 
of people with this diagnosis (Bozikas et al., 2007b). Thus, it would be of interest to 
investigate further how these groups may differ to those experiencing schizophrenia, 
including patients with bipolar disorder who are currently symptomatic. 
Research in this field would improve if the same paradigms, stimuli and 
measurement scales were used consistently, and if these measures were selected to 
ensure the greatest ecologically validity. If humour is explored because of the potential 
clinical implications a deficient humour response may affect social impairment it would 
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be favourable to investigate humour within a realistic social situation. Future studies 
should select novel stimuli that will be equally unfamiliar to all groups in order to 
reduce the potential impact of previous exposure to and memory of the stimuli 
(Corcoran, 2008). Controlling for IQ enables a firmer argument that differences 
between clinical patients and controls cannot be attributed to differences of cognitive 
functioning. However, this alone is not enough, since working memory, executive 
function, attention, processing speed, abstract thinking are also useful variables to 
account for as they are potentially all involved in humour comprehension depending on 
the paradigm used. It is also important to measure both verbal and non verbal joke 
comprehension. There is a growing number of studies exploring language, irony and 
metaphors (e.g. Langdon, Colthart, Ward & Catts, 2002), but no studies that ask patients 
to explain verbal jokes they have just heard. This would enable the exploration of the 
differences between the modalities, whilst also adding to the understanding of language 
impairments associated with psychosis. 
Medication and symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, and mood 
(particularly, anxiety and anhedonia) are all important variables for researchers to 
consider in relation to humour experiences in this clinical group. In addition, studies 
should improve the specificity of their findings by including a non-psychotic psychiatric 
control group. Furthermore, larger samples exploring a more homogeneous 
representation of patients (first episode versus chronic patients) who are in different 
stages of illness (acute, stable and remission) would help hone conclusions about 
deficits in the appreciation or comprehension of humour.  
Implications for Clinical Practice 
Research into humour experiences in the context of psychosis could hold 
numerous valuable implications which may supplement established psychological 
interventions. The use of humour as an intervention for patients with psychosis is 
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slowly developing (Gelkopf, 2011) and there have been some empirical investigations 
into the effect of humour-centred activities on the behaviour of inpatients experiencing 
psychosis. For instance, Gelkopf, Gonen, Kurs, Melemad and Bleich (2006) showed 
films on two inpatient wards five days a week for three months. One group were shown 
only humorous movies, and the other a mixture of movies of which only 15% were 
humorous. A significant reduction in clinically rated negative symptoms, anxiety and 
depression was observed in those who watched the humorous movies. Furthermore, 
self-reported anger decreased and social competence improved. Thus, more research is 
needed to investigate the use of humour as a coping mechanism for individuals 
experiencing psychosis in order to inform psychological interventions and clinical 
assessments. 
Conclusions 
While to date there seems to be support for a deficit in the comprehension of 
humour, it is less equivocal whether adults with psychosis experiencing current 
symptoms, particularly negative symptoms, have reduced humour appreciation capacity. 
The highest quality studies have yielded different patterns of results, yet despite the 
high comorbidity of depression and anxiety in adults experiencing paranoia (Freeman, 
2007) not all studies controlled for mood. Not only would the replication of the 
significant findings to date add weight to these lines of inquiry, these studies would 
enhance the argument that individual differences in the cognitive and affective 
underpinnings of psychosis could be better understood in general, proving of more 
value than a diagnostic label often applied today.  
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SECTION 2: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REPORT 
 
A Preliminary Investigation into ‘Theory of Mind’ and ‘Attributional Style’ in 
Adults with Grandiose Delusions 
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Abstract 
Objectives. This study tests the application of socio-cognitive models of paranoid 
delusions to grandiose delusions. 
Design. A cross-sectional design was employed to compare the performance of 
individuals with psychosis with grandiose delusions to a depressed control group on 
measures of Theory of Mind (ToM) and attributional style. A symptom approach was 
also taken to investigate the association between persecutory delusions and grandiose 
delusions in terms of cognitive style. 
Method. 18 participants with psychosis and 14 participants with depression were 
recruited. ToM was measured using a non-verbal joke appreciation task and a verbal 
stories task.  Attributional style was measured using the Internal, Personal and 
Situational Attributions Questionnaire (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). An innovative 
dialogue task exploring autobiographical memories was also employed to investigate 
ToM and attributional style. 
Results. Participants experiencing grandiose delusions performed significantly worse 
on both ToM tasks and produced significantly fewer references to mental states in the 
dialogue task. Furthermore, these participants made significantly more atypical answers 
when explaining the joke behind the ToM cartoons. No differences for subjective 
funniness ratings or attributional style were found. Following a symptom-based 
approach, the presence of a grandiose delusion was significantly associated with poorer 
ToM on the joke appreciation and stories task. 
Conclusions. Participants with a grandiose delusion appear to have a ToM impairment 
independently of the severity of a comorbid persecutory delusion. These findings could 
stimulate further research into cognitive styles and a specific symptom investigation.  
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Attributional Style, Grandiosity, Delusions, Mania 
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A Preliminary Investigation into ‗Theory of Mind‘ and ‗Attributional Style‘ in Adults 
with Grandiose Delusions 
Recent research has demonstrated that delusions are complex and multi-factorial 
in origin, resulting from a combination of biological, psychological and social factors 
(Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002). They also vary in content, 
with prevalence studies demonstrating persecutory delusions to be the most common in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Thus it is no surprise that these have received the 
most theoretical and empirical attention. After persecutory delusions, grandiose 
delusions are reported to be one of the most common types of delusion in psychosis 
(Applebaum, Robins, & Roth, 1999) and the most common symptom in bipolar mania 
(Dunayevich & Keck, 2000; Goodwin & Jamison, 1990; Turkington & Kingdon, 1996). 
Grandiose delusions are defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) as ―delusions of inflated worth, power, knowledge, identity, or 
special relationship to a deity or famous person‖ (American Psychological Association, 
2000). They are found across a wide range of psychiatric conditions, such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and patients with substance abuse disorders 
(Applebaum et al., 1999).  
Socio-cognitive studies investigate the perception, processing and interpretation 
of social information to explore the way that people think about themselves and others 
(Newman, 2001). People experiencing psychosis have difficulties identifying social 
cues, conveying their feelings to others, identifying affect in themselves and in others, 
and with the appropriate attribution of causes of important life events (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). Furthermore, the ability to correctly interpret and predict the mental 
states of other people, known as theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), 
has been the subject of much research. This ability is central to Frith's (1992) 
neuropsychological theory of schizophrenia. These patients have been shown to have 
difficulties with ToM tasks whether it be during a first episode of psychosis (Bertrand, 
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Sutton, Achim, Malla & Lepage, 2007) or with a long term chronic duration (Corcoran 
2003; Corcoran & Frith, 2003). Furthermore, the ToM deficits in acutely psychotic 
patients can be as severe as those seen in the context of Asperger‘s syndrome (Craig, 
Hatton, Craig, & Bentall, 2004). In particular, Frith proposed that people reporting 
persecutory and referential delusions develop ToM as normal but lose the ability during 
acute psychotic episodes. In a critical review by Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood 
and Kinderman (2001), it was concluded that individuals with persecutory delusions 
perform more poorly than both psychiatric and non-psychiatric comparison groups on 
ToM tasks. Some studies have also found ToM deficits in participants whose 
persecutory delusions are in remission (e.g. Randall, Corcoran, Day, & Bentall, 2003). 
More recently, Harrington, Langdon, Seigert, and McClure (2005a) found that the ToM 
deficit was only observed in those participants with schizophrenia who also had 
persecutory delusions.  Thus, several studies have since taken a transdiagnostic 
symptom-focused approach to exploring ToM performance. Corcoran et al. (2008) 
found poor performance on ToM tasks in adults with persecutory delusions irrespective 
of diagnosis and found that participants‘ performance was correlated with the degree of 
distress caused by this symptom.  
Although the literature indicates that ToM problems may be present in people 
with persecutory delusions, it is clear that they are not seen exclusively in the context of 
this symptom. Freeman (2007) concluded that ToM deficits are clearly present in 
patients with predominantly paranoid symptoms but advocates that studies are needed to 
examine ToM abilities in relation to dimensional measures of delusional ideation or 
paranoia. The failure to consistently replicate the specific relationship between ToM 
impairment and paranoia may lie in the nature of the tasks employed to assess ToM, as 
some studies have shown that ToM impairments in the context of positive psychotic 
symptoms are less prevalent when IQ is controlled for (Harrington et al., 2005a). 
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Furthermore, it is possible that the use of medication could impair cognitive 
performance. However, the longitudinal evidence for an association between cognitive 
performance due to atypical antipsychotics, neuroleptics or antidepressants is complex 
(Bilder et al., 2002; Biringer, Rongve & Lund, 2009). Atypical antipsychotics have been 
shown to either improve (e.g. Keefe, Silva, Perkins & Lieberman, 1999) or have 
detrimental effects (e.g. Frangou, Donaldson, Hajdulis, Landau & Goldstein, 2005) on 
cognitive performance. One way to attempt to control for the effects of medication on 
cognition in research studies is to convert the participants prescribed medication into 
Chlorpromazine equivalents or dosage effects. However, according to Rijcken, Monster, 
Brouwers and de Jong-van den Berg (2003), the use of these is extremely ambiguous 
with discrepancies arising across studies.  
Cartoon jokes are one of the frequently used measures of ToM. However, 
Harrington and colleagues suggest that any ToM difficulty associated with persecutory 
delusions may be subtle in nature and not easily demonstrated by the tasks currently 
available, and thus more sophisticated symptom-focused research into ToM is needed 
(Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005b). Other reasons why previous findings in this 
area have been so inconsistent could be related to small sample sizes and the variable 
methods to group symptoms.  
More recently, a preliminary cognitive model of grandiose delusions has been 
put forward, suggesting that persecutory and grandiose delusions shared distinct, yet 
overlapping psychological processes (Knowles, McCarthy-Jones & Rowse, 2011). This 
study aims to test this model, and hypothesises that grandiose delusions may be 
associated to ToM impairment to the same degree as persecutory delusions. 
Attributional style 
Another factor that is pertinent to the relationship between ToM and delusions is 
the role of attributional style. Attributions are the causal explanations that individuals 
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give for their own behaviour and that of others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In a non-clinical 
population, the default tendency is to attribute negative events to external factors and 
positive events to the self, a pattern known as the self-serving bias (Mezulis, Abramson, 
Hyde & Hankin, 2004). Individuals with psychosis show these biases to an even greater 
extent. Bentall and Kinderman‘s (1998) model of paranoia proposes that persecutory 
delusions are the product of two mechanisms: a tendency to avoid internal (self-
blaming) attributions for negative events, and an inability to take into account the 
complexities of the situation-person interaction, a skill that is likely to be honed through 
ToM skills. These mechanisms give rise to an ‗externalising bias‘; an exaggerated 
tendency to assign blame outside of the self for negative events, and the ‗personalising 
bias‘; an exaggerated tendency to blame other people rather than chance (Craig et al., 
2004; Janssen et al., 2006). The paranoid person‘s avoidance of internal attributions for 
negative events may reflect a dysfunctional strategy for regulating self-esteem (Kaney 
& Bentall, 1989; Bentall, Kaney & Dewey, 1991; Candido & Romney, 1990; Lyon, 
Kaney & Bentall, 1994; Fear, Sharp & Healy, 1996; Sharp, Fear & Healy, 1997; Young 
& Bentall, 1997). This theory has been labelled the delusions-as-defence theory 
(Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994), suggesting that this mechanism is an extreme 
form of the self-serving bias found in the general population (Kinderman, Dunbar & 
Bentall, 1998). On the whole, the evidence for attributional biases (particularly the 
personalising bias) and ToM impairments in people experiencing psychosis is fairly 
consistent (Freeman, 2007; Harrington et al., 2005b). 
In contrast to those with persecutory ideation, participants with depression have 
been shown to display excessively internal attributions for negative events (Sharp et al. 
1997). The existing research suggests that individuals with psychosis and concurrent 
depression display a tendency to make internal attributions for negative events (Candido 
& Romney, 1990; Krstev, Jackson & Maude, 1999). Given that depression and 
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psychosis have high rates of comorbidity, this complicates the research field further. 
The mood of patients with a diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder for example fluctuates 
between severe depression and mania with psychotic features. 
The measurement of attributional style typically relies on self-report measures 
such as the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982). These measures are 
easy to administer but participants report that they are difficult to complete (Freeman, 
2007). Furthermore, the ASQ, designed to be administered to college students and 
depressed patients, has been reported to have low internal reliability (Reivich, 1995). 
Thus, the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) was developed to investigate the personal/universal 
dimension with psychotic samples specifically. Like the ASQ, the IPSAQ is comprised 
of a series of 32 hypothetical situations for which the participant is required to generate 
a cause and to indicate whether this cause is internal (personal), or external (either due 
to others or due to situation/circumstances). Although the IPSAQ is less complex than 
the ASQ and has acceptable internal reliability (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), some 
participants report difficulty in pretending that hypothetical events have occurred in 
their lives (Beese & Stratton, 2004). To increase ecological validity, methods using 
natural speech from this population may be preferred (e.g. Stewart, Corcoran & Drake, 
2009). The analysis of speech and dialogue allows not only an exploration of mental 
state words but also offers a quantitative measure of the different types of attributions 
made for autobiographical memories. This study will adopt both a quantitative measure 
(the IPSAQ) and a dialogue task in order to investigate attributional style in people with 
current grandiose delusions.  
The Present Study 
Although more researchers are now adopting a symptom orientated approach to 
improve our understanding of psychiatric disorders (Bentall, Jackson, & Pilgrim, 1988; 
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Bentall, 2003), little research has focussed on grandiose delusions (Knowles, McCarthy-
Jones and Rowse, 2011). There is however a growing body of research into ToM 
performance in affective disorders (Bonshtein, Leiser & Levine, 2006; Bora et al., 2005; 
Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Corcoran et al. 2008; Doody, Gotz, Johnstone, Frith & 
Cunningham-Owens, 1998; Kerr, Dunbar, & Bentall., 2003; Inoue, Yamada & Kamba, 
2006; Lahera et al., 2008; Malhi et al., 2008; Montag et al. 2010; Schenkel, Marlow-
O‘Connor, Moss, Sweeny, & Pavaluri, 2008), but limited theoretical understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying the association between grandiose delusions and ToM.  
Support for a link between ToM and the personalising is mixed (Craig et al., 
2004; Langdon, Corner, McClaren, Ward & Coltheart, 2006; Randall et al., 2003) and 
warrants further investigation. In the context of grandiose ideation, we might expect to 
observe more internal personal attributions for positive events and more external 
attributions for negative events (Jolley et al., 2006).  This would accord with Bentall 
and Kinderman‘s theory (1998), in that the individual may make more explicit internal 
attributions for positive events in order to regulate self-esteem. A concurrent ToM 
deficit could contribute to the maintenance of a grandiose delusion, if more external 
personal attributions for negative events resulted from an inability to adequately 
represent the role of dynamic situational factors in determining the mental and 
emotional states and interpersonal behaviour of others.  
This study aims to investigate these cognitive processes in people experiencing 
grandiose delusions. Specifically, it was hypothesised that: 
(i) Participants with psychosis will score poorly on both types of ToM tasks in 
comparison to depressed control participants. 
(ii) Participants with psychosis will show a strong self-serving attributional bias, 
making excessively external (blaming other people and circumstances) 
attributions for negative events and excessively internal attributions for positive 
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events. These results will be found in both the IPSAQ and dialogue task. This 
will contrast to the typical depressive attributional style seen in the unipolar 
depressed ‗psychiatric control‘ group.  
(iii) When exploring by delusion type, participants with persecutory delusions will 
score lower on both ToM tasks compared to the participants who do not 
experience this symptom. 
(iv) Participants experiencing grandiose delusions will score lower on both ToM 
tasks than participants without this symptom. Furthermore, we can expect this 
impairment to remain after controlling for the severity of persecutory delusions 
in participants who experience both these symptoms. 
(v) Participants with grandiose delusions will also demonstrate excessive 
personalising and externalising biases. These biases will be found in both the 
IPSAQ and the dialogue task. 
In addition to these hypotheses, this study also set out to investigate whether ToM 
performance is associated with a personalising and externalising bias irrespective of 
diagnostic category or symptoms. 
Methods 
The study received ethical approval from the South Yorkshire NHS Ethics 
Committee (Appendix C). Approval was also granted by the South West Yorkshire and 
Sheffield Health and Social Care NHS Foundation Trust Research & Development 
departments (Appendices D & E). 
Participants 
This study adopted a two-group case-control design to investigate performance 
on two ToM and two attributional style tasks in currently depressed and grandiose 
populations. An a priori power analysis based on the second order ToM task data from 
Corcoran et al.‘s (2008) cross-sectional transdiagnostic study was conducted using 
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G*Power to determine the required sample size (Erdfelder & Faul & Buchner, 1996). 
Using Cohen‘s (1988) criteria, a large effect size of f = .82 was assumed. The findings 
showed that with p = .05 and two groups of participants, a total sample of 15 
participants would be required to achieve 80% power if conducting an analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA). However, Corcoran et al. (2008) looked at ToM performance 
in individuals experiencing persecutory delusions, whereas this study investigated ToM 
performance in individuals experiencing grandiose delusions. Therefore, the effect size 
was reduced from .82 to a more conservative .5 to ensure the study was not 
underpowered. Consequently, the result of the a priori power analysis revealed that a 
total sample of 34 participants would be required to achieve 80% power. 
Recruitment 
A convenience sampling methodology was adopted to recruit individuals 
accessing either NHS mental health services or third sector providers. Potential referrers 
were invited by letter (Appendix F) to identify possible participants who may be 
suitable to take part in the study. A PowerPoint presentation (Appendix G) was also 
delivered by the author to outline the proposed project at team meetings in order to 
engage clinical staff. Clinicians were provided with information sheets (Appendices H 
& I) that could be given to potential participants, highlighting the researcher‘s contact 
details and a brief description of the study. Follow up phone calls and emails were 
carried out to maintain the relationship with clinicians and to continue the progress of 
the recruitment over a period of eight months. 
Experimental group 
Demographic information for both participant groups can be found in Table 1. 
Eighteen people (ten women) with psychosis were recruited to the experimental group. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 65 years (Mage = 43.4 years, SD = 9.1). Only one 
participant in this study was African-Caribbean, while the rest of the sample recruited in 
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this study were white-British. The inclusion criteria were a DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnosis of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, or delusional disorder. In addition, participants were identified 
by a clinician as currently experiencing a DSM-IV defined grandiose delusion. All 
participants in the experimental group also had to endorse either item 6 (Do you ever 
feel as if you are, or destined to be someone very important?) or 7 (Do you ever feel that 
you are a very special or unusual person?) on the short form of the Peters Delusion 
Inventory (PDI-21, Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004). Participants who opted into 
the study from third sector organisations such as Bipolar UK were recruited if they 
endorsed these items and had a diagnosis of Bipolar disorder by a consultant 
psychiatrist. This was clarified both by the referrers and by the participants when 
providing medical information on the day of testing. Fourteen participants had a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, two of schizophrenia, and two of schizoaffective disorder. 
Five participants were inpatients on psychiatric wards, and 13 were psychiatric 
outpatients attending regular clinic appointments. 
Because this study involved a measure of natural speech, only people with 
English as a first language were included. Participants with a history of central nervous 
system disease or head injury, a learning disability or pervasive developmental disorder 
were excluded from this study as these comorbidities would have been likely to impact 
on IQ and cognitive performance.  
Controls 
The depressed control group comprised 14 participants (Mage = 43.5 years, SD = 
13) with a primary diagnosis of depression (as defined by the DSM-IV). Nine members 
of the group were women. Participants were recruited via an Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) service. It was an aim of this study that both groups 
COGNITIVE STYLES IN GRANDIOSE DELUSIONS  52 
would be matched for age, sex and IQ as far as possible. The same exclusion criteria for 
the experimental group were applied to the controls.  
 
Table 1.  
Comparison of the demographics of both groups 
 Grandiose group 
(n=18) 
Depressed controls 
(n=14) 
Statistical test 
 Mean SD Mean SD  
Gender (% female) 56%  64%  x
2
(1, n=32)=0.25 
Age (years) 43.39 13.02 43.50 9.11 t(30)=0.27 
Education (years) 14.28 1.93 14.50 1.45 t(30)=0.36 
Years since diagnosis 12.83 11.27 10.21 10.94 U=93, Z=-1.258 
No. of medications 1.39 1.20 .86 .36 t(30)=-1.79 
WASI IQ 106.61 11.13 110.0 9.94 t(30)=0.91 
Vocabulary 56.33 7.11 55.21 6.86 t(30)=-0.45 
Matrix Reasoning 50.83 8.89 55.29 8.04 t(30)=1.46 
Note. IQ=Intelligent Quotient 
 
Procedure 
Participants identified through NHS services were asked by their care co-
ordinator to give permission for the researcher to contact them to arrange a meeting. 
These meetings were usually held at an NHS base, the University department or client‘s 
home. The nature of the study was explained in participant information sheets 
(Appendix H & I) and reiterated by the researcher during the meeting. All participants 
provided informed consent (Appendix J). Demographic details were recorded on a 
screening form (Appendix K). Where participants were unable to answer any questions 
regarding diagnoses or medication, they were asked to consent to the researcher to 
speak to their care co-ordinator/referring clinician or to access their medical notes. This 
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was specified on the information sheet prior to interviewing. Participants were verbally 
debriefed about the aims of the study after all tasks had been administered, and any 
questions were answered. The questionnaires and tasks were administered in a fixed 
order. No financial incentive was provided to participants, although expenses were 
reimbursed for those who travelled to the session. 
Service user involvement 
In order to ensure the study was accessible to participants and that the procedure 
caused as little anxiety as possible, a service user who has a diagnosis of Bipolar 
Disorder was consulted before recruiting participants. The service user provided 
feedback on the information sheets and consent form and estimated the measures would 
take most people no longer than 35 minutes to complete.  
Measuring delusions 
As well as having been identified by the referring clinician as having a current 
grandiose delusion, participants were asked to complete the PDI-21 (Peters et al., 2004) 
as a measure of delusion proneness. The PDI (Appendix L) is quick to administer and is 
easily accessible, and has been used in a number of studies to identify individuals with 
both persecutory delusions (Corcoran et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2006) and grandiose 
delusions (Armando, Nelson, Yung, Ross, Birchwood, & Girardi, 2010; Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2007; Peters et al. 1999; Scott, Chant, Andrews & McGrath, 2006; 
Verdoux, et al., 1998). Although this is a self-report measure, studies have previously 
shown that participants can reliably provide information about the presence and type of 
delusional ideation (Lincoln, Ziegler, Lullman, Muller & Rief, 2010). The measure has 
high test-retest reliability (r = 0.71) and demonstrates good internal consistency and 
concurrent validity, and it has been used with both clinical and non-clinical groups 
(Peters et al., 2004). The questionnaire also measures the presence of a range of other 
types of delusional beliefs (e.g. religious) as well as providing ratings of distress, 
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conviction and pre-occupation on a scale of 1-5. Thus, the PDI provides information on 
the total number of items endorsed (out of 21), total distress, preoccupation and 
conviction (a score of up to 105 for each dimension), and total delusional ideation (the 
sum of all scores which can be added up to 336). The types of delusions and 
experiences measured include persecution, suspiciousness, paranoid ideation, 
religiosity, grandiosity, paranormal beliefs, thought disturbance, negative self, 
depersonalisation, catastrophic ideation and thought broadcast, and ideas of reference 
and influence. All types of delusions have two questions each, thus a combined total 
possible score of 32 when incorporating distress, preoccupation and conviction. 
Depersonalisation however has just one question (a total score of 16).  
Mood 
As the link between anxiety/depression and paranoia is strong (Freeman, 2007), 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was 
administered to both groups to ensure that any impaired performance could not be better 
explained by co-morbid mood symptoms. The HADS (Appendix M) has high face 
validity, criterion validity, and internal consistency (between 0.76 and 0.41 for the 
anxiety items and up to 0.60 for the depression items).  
In addition, the Altman self-rating mania scale (ASRM; Altman, Hedeker, 
Peterson, & Davis, 1997) was administered to measure current symptoms of mania. 
This measure (Appendix N) has been shown to correlate well with the Young Mania 
Rating Scale (YMRS; Young, Biggs, Ziegler & Meyer, 1978, r = 0.718) and the 
Clinician Administered Rating Scale-Mania (CARS-M; Altman, Hedeker, Janicak, 
Peterson, & Davis, 1994, r = 0.766). 
Estimated IQ 
The two-subtest version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Weschler, 1999) has been used in previous studies exploring ToM in paranoia 
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(e.g. Corcoran et al. 2008; Langdon, Ward & Coltheart, 2010; Moore et al. 2006). The 
WASI FSIQ-2 has a correlation co-efficient of 0.81 to the WAIS-III FSIQ and a high 
validity coefficients for the subtests, ranging between .66 (matrix reasoning) and .88 
(vocabulary) in an adult population (Weschler, 1999). This general estimate of current 
intellectual ability allowed an exploration of whether socio-cognitive functioning was 
independent of IQ.  
Theory of Mind: The Stories Task 
Harrington et al. (2005a) suggest that future research should maintain a greater 
consistency in the ToM tasks employed by different research groups to facilitate 
comparisons between results. Therefore to continue consistency with the existing 
research in this field, the most commonly used task for assessing theory of mind was 
adopted: the first and second order false-belief task (Bora et al. 2009). This task 
(Appendix O) is brief and makes minimal demands on participants‘ cognitive resources 
(Kerr et al. 2003) and has been found to hold good validity for participants of average 
intellectual ability (Shryane et al., 2008). Four short stories (as previously used by 
Moore et al. 2006, Corcoran et al. 2008 and Shryane et al. 2008) were read out loud to 
participants, who were simultaneously shown a series of cartoon drawings depicting the 
events in each story. Two of the stories assess the ability to understand states of false 
belief and two assess a characters intention to deceive. All four stories were designed to 
contain both a first-order question (when the contents of a single person‘s mind must be 
inferred) followed by a second-order question (where the contents of two people‘s 
minds must be inferred). In addition, participants were also asked questions that tested 
their understanding of the state of the world (i.e. a reality question), and additional 
questions of memory and non-mental state inference. Responses to all questions were 
recorded as correct or incorrect.  
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The Joke Appreciation Task 
Researchers should ideally use a range of ToM tasks as they are heterogeneous 
and differentially sensitive to IQ (Harrington et al., 2005a; Shryane et al., 2008). Thus, 
the current study also employed a non-verbal visual joke appreciation task which has 
been shown to discriminate between people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and non-
clinical controls (e.g. Corcoran, Cahill and Frith, 1997; Marjoram et al. 2005). A 
selection of 10 caption-less cartoons (taken from the set used by Gallagher et al. 2000) 
were shown one at a time in a fixed pseudorandom order, and participants were asked to 
―explain the joke‖ (Appendix P) by providing a short account of their interpretation of 
the joke‘s meaning. Responses were given a score between 0 and 3 to provide an index 
of the overall extent to which participants provide mental state explanations (Appendix 
P). Five of the jokes could be understood and appreciated at a physical or behavioural 
level although they can evoke mental state inferences too. The other five jokes 
definitely require an understanding of one or more of the characters‘ mental states in 
order to understand them. The scores given for each of the jokes were summed to given 
an index of overall ToM. Participants were also asked to subjectively grade each 
cartoon for humour on a scale of 1-5. This was for the purpose of comparison between 
both groups and to explore whether the level of humour detected correlates with the 
participants‘ ability to infer ToM in the jokes.  
Given that studies have found normal appreciation with impaired comprehension 
of humour in adults experiencing psychosis (e.g. Marjoram et al., 2005; 2006; Tsoi et 
al., 2008; Ecker, Levine & Zigler, 1973), it is possible that individuals experiencing 
psychosis and those not may find different aspects of the joke funny (Corcoran, 2008). 
This study therefore also investigated ‗typicality‘. To do so, the narrative interpretations 
of jokes were rated as either typical/common or atypical/uncommon. This judgement 
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was made based upon a clear derivation from the typical explanations given to the 
researcher (see Appendix P for typical explanations given for these cartoons). 
Attributional Style 
The IPSAQ (Appendix Q) is a self-report 32 item questionnaire which describes 
16 positive and 16 negative social situations (e.g. ‗a friend thinks you are interesting‘) 
presented in a fixed pseudorandom order. The participant is asked to write down the 
single most likely cause for this and to categorize this cause as something about 
themselves (internal self-attribution), something about other people (external-personal 
attribution) or something about the situation (external-situation attribution). These six 
subscales (three for positive events and three for negative events) can then be used to 
compute two cognitive bias scores which quantify whether the participant has a 
tendency to externalise or to personalise attributions for negative and positive social 
events. The ‗externalising bias‘ is calculated by subtracting the number of negative self-
attributions from the number of positive self-attributions. A positive externalising bias 
score indicates a strong self-serving bias in which the respondent attributes cause to 
themselves less for negative events than for positive events. The percentage of 
externally attributed negative events (external-personal or external-situational) that were 
attributed to other people is calculated to give the ‗personalising bias‘ score. A 
personalising bias score greater than 0.5 represents a tendency to attribute the causes of 
negative events to other people as opposed to situations. These two scores have 
acceptable levels of reliability (Cronbach‘s alphas of 0.7189 and 0.7609 respectively, 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996).  
Semi-Structured Dialogue Task 
Given the concerns over the psychometric properties of the IPSAQ and 
anecdotal reports indicating that participants have difficulty completing these 
attributional style questionnaires (Freeman, 2007), this study also used a quantitative 
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analysis of semi-structured dialogue. This approach explored how well participants 
make ‗online‘ attributions during conversation by examining dialogue and quantifying 
the speech according to the three types of attributional style typically explored in 
previous research. This task was intended to provide a more meaningful and 
ecologically valid method measure of attributional style in a currently symptomatic 
group.  
Designed as a semi-structured conversation, the researcher asked four 
autobiographical questions of the participant to prompt discourse. Participants were 
asked to describe two real positive events (―when was the last time you had a 
visitor/you laughed out loud?‖) and two real negative events (―when was the last time 
you were lied to/not listened to?‖). The researcher was free to clarify any confusing or 
interesting points made by the participant. Although the researcher guided the 
participant to make attributions for recent events that have happened to them, the free 
nature of the response allowed the participant to make any type and number of 
attributions for these real events. The aim was for the conversation to last between 2 and 
7 minutes, although this was flexible for participants who either could not maintain a 
conversation for that long or who wanted to talk about their thoughts for longer. 
Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the SPSS Software (PASW version 18 
for Windows). Independent t-tests and chi square analyses were performed to confirm 
that the groups were adequately matched for age, IQ, and gender. A series of 
independent t-tests were then carried out to determine whether there were any 
differences between the groups on their performance on the joke appreciation task for 
understanding, funniness ratings, and number of atypical responses given. Further 
independent samples t-tests were used to explore the differences between groups on the 
ToM stories tasks and a series of one-way ANCOVAs were carried out to control for 
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any significant differences on the memory, reality, and inference control questions to 
test whether differences between the groups remained. For attributional style, 
independent t-tests tested for significant differences between the groups on mean 
personalising and externalising bias scores. A chi square analysis was then carried out 
to explore associations between the groups and the bias scores.   
Finally, the groups‘ were collapsed to allow further investigation for 
associations of specific symptoms, irrespective of diagnostic group, on ToM 
performance and attributional style. Delusions (as measured by the PDI-21) relating to 
paranoia (persecutory ideation and delusions of reference) or grandiosity (grandiose and 
religious delusions) were investigated. 
The conversational task. The coding procedure for this task was similar to that 
used by Stewart, Corcoran and Drake (2009). Participants‘ answers were tape recorded, 
transcribed and coded independently by two researchers. One rater was blind to group 
membership. The other rater could provide clarification over any confusing details or 
exchanges in the transcripts. One rater joined the author in coding the mental state 
words and a different rater joined the author to code the different attributional style 
types within the transcripts. To calculate inter-rater reliability for coding of mental state 
words, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC; ρ = 0.98, p < 0.0001) between the two 
raters indicated almost perfect agreement (Futrell, 1995). 
The total number of words generated by each participant was summed to control 
for the amount of speech produced. The participants‘ speech was then divided into 
―speech phrases‖ encapsulating separate ideas or details. The raters then examined each 
phrase for evidence of references to emotion (such as ―confused‖ or ―liked‖), intention 
(such as ―wanted‖) and mental state (―think‖, ―believe‖) during the course of the 
conversation. Interactive mental states were also included. For instance, the phrases 
―you know‖ and ―aren‘t they‖ reflect that inferences are being made about the 
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conversational partner‘s mental state. The percentage of mental state references was 
calculated by dividing the number of mental state words by the total number of words 
produced, and multiplied by 100. Lastly, the transcripts were analysed quantitatively to 
assess whether the participants‘ explanations for each situation were primarily defined 
as something about them (internal), other people (external-personal) or the situation 
(external-situational). Any errors in attributions made by the participant were subtracted 
(i.e. the participant initially states that the event was caused by them and then decides it 
was to do with somebody else). Percentage scores were again derived by dividing the 
counts for each type of attribution by the total number of speech phrases, and multiplied 
by 100. A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted on the data extracted from 
the coded and scored transcripts to explore differences in the number of different types 
of causal attributions made by the two groups. 
Where the raters disagreed on the identification of mental state references or the 
type of attribution made, a brief discussion was held until consensus was reached. If a 
disagreement persisted, the non-blind rater deferred to the blind rater to minimise bias. 
The outcome of such disagreements was noted so that they could be applied to similar 
later disagreements, if any, to ensure the ratings were consistent. The percentage of 
inter-rater agreement (92.58%) was calculated to estimate the inter-rater reliability. 
Results 
Analyses by Diagnostic group  
Table 1 shows the groups were matched for age, gender, education, years of 
illness, medication and IQ, vocabulary and matrix reasoning. All variables were found 
to be normally distributed except for length of illness. As expected, there were 
significant differences between groups for depression, anxiety, mania and the total PDI 
score (see Table 2), with the depressed group scoring higher for HADS depression (t 
(29.21) = 5.15, p < .0001) and anxiety (t (29.09) = 4.28, p < .0001), and the psychoses 
COGNITIVE STYLES IN GRANDIOSE DELUSIONS  61 
group having higher mania (t (24.08) = -3.96, p < 0.001) and PDI scores (t (30) = -2.11, 
p = .043). Mann Whitney U tests showed no significant differences between those who 
were on no medication and participants on one or more medications for the joke task (U 
= 68.50, z = -1.201, p = .230), ToM stories (U = 82.50, z = -.61, p = .545) or the 
personalising bias (U = 62.50, z = -1.46, p = .145) and externalising bias (U = 91.50, z = 
- 0.20, p = .844). 
 
Table 2.  
Mood variables for both groups 
 Grandiose group 
(n=18) 
Depressed controls 
(n=14) 
Statistical test 
 Mean SD Mean SD  
HADS Depression 5.44 4.96 12.93 3.22 t(29.21) = 5.15*** 
HADS Anxiety 7.72 4.69 13.57 3.01 t(29.09) = 4.28*** 
AMRS Mania 7.76 4.58 2.93 1.94 t(24.08) = -3.96** 
PDI Total Score 106.78 57.21 65.57 51.50 t(30.00) = -2.11* 
PDI Grandiosity total score  17.61 7.05 0.71 2.67 t(22.85) = -9.35*** 
Note. HADS=Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, PDI=Peters Delusion Inventory. 
*p = 0.05, two-tailed test, **p < 0.001, two-tailed test, ***p < 0.0001, two-tailed test 
 
Group performance on Theory of Mind tasks 
Jokes task. The grandiose group performed significantly worse compared to 
depressed controls on the ToM understanding of the cartoon jokes (t (30) = 3.65, p < 
.001, r = .55). This effect size was large according to Cohen‘s (1988) criteria. There was 
also a significant difference between the groups for the number of atypical responses 
even after controlling for PDI thought disorder score (F(1, 29) = 8.583, p = .007). No 
group differences existed for the perceived funniness of the jokes (t (30) = -0.799, p = 
.431) 
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Theory of Mind Stories. Overall, the grandiose group performed significantly 
worse on the theory of mind stories task (t (30) = 3.07, p = 0.05, r = .49). The grandiose 
group also answered more of the memory control questions embedded in these stories 
incorrectly (t (22.71) = 3.45, p = .02), particularly for second-order memory questions (t 
(23.07) = 3.32, p = .003).  
 
Table 3.  
Means and Standard Deviations for the ToM tasks 
 Grandiose group 
(n=18) 
Depressed controls 
(n=14) 
Statistical test 
 Mean SD Mean SD t(30) 
ToM joke appreciation task  12.56 2.30 17.71 4.95 3.65* 
Subjective funniness ratings 23.94 9.70 21.43 7.57 -0.80 
No. of atypical responses 2.00 1.68 0.43 0.76 -3.24* 
Stories task total ToM  
     First-order ToM 
     Second-order ToM 
4.78 
3.33 
1.44 
1.31 
0.77 
1.04 
6.14 
3.71 
2.71 
1.17 
0.99 
1.14 
3.07* 
1.23 
3.30* 
     First-order Memory 
     Second-order Memory 
     Total Memory score 
     First-order Reality 
     Second-order Reality 
     First-order Inference 
     Second-order Inference 
3.94 
3.06 
7.00 
3.83 
3.50 
3.17 
3.33 
0.24 
0.94 
0.97 
0.51 
0.79 
0.92 
0.84 
4.00 
3.86 
7.86 
3.93 
3.36 
3.57 
3.64 
0.00 
0.36 
0.36 
0.27 
0.84 
0.65 
0.50 
0.88 
3.32* 
3.45* 
0.63 
-0.50 
1.39 
1.22 
Note. *p = 0.05, two-tailed test, ToM=Theory of Mind. 
 
However, a one-way ANCOVA revealed that after controlling for the significant 
group difference in performance on the total memory questions the ToM group 
difference remained significant (F(1, 29) = 8.306, p = .007, u = 0.22). An independent 
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samples t-test found no difference between groups on first-order ToM performance (t 
(30) = 1.23, p = .230) but there was a difference in the expected direction for second-
order ToM (t (30) = 3.29, p = .003). The groups performed significantly differently on 
the false-belief ToM questions (t (30) = 2.94, p = .006) but differences between the 
groups for deception ToM questions (Appendix R) were not significant (t (30) =1.25, p 
= .221). This suggests that it was the second-order false-belief questions that were the 
most sensitive. 
Group performance on IPSAQ. Notably, across the whole sample only three 
people showed no evidence of an externalising bias (see Table 4). Two participants 
were from the grandiose group and one was from the depressed group. Because of this 
no further analyses were carried out for the externalising bias. A Chi square analysis 
revealed no significant differences between the groups for the personalising bias (χ2 (1, 
n = 32) = 1.659, p = .198, phi = 0.23).  
 
Table 4. 
Frequency counts for the externalising and personalising bias 
 Personalising Bias Externalising Bias 
 Present Not present Present Not present 
Grandiose group (n=18) 13 (72.22%) 5 (27.78%) 16 (88.89%) 2 (11.11%) 
Depressed group (n=14) 7 (50%) 7 (50%) 13 (92.86%) 1 (7.14%) 
 
Group performance on the dialogue task. The total recording time for all 32 
participants was one hour, 45 minutes, and 6 seconds. Across all participants, 
conversations lasted for a mean of 3 minutes and 27 seconds. The means and standard 
deviations of conversation length for each group can be found in Table 5. There was no 
significant difference between the groups for total recording time (t (30) = -0.83, p = 
.414). The psychosis group produced significantly more speech phrases than controls (t 
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(29.10) = -2.72, p = .011) yet made significantly fewer implicit mental state inferences 
than the controls (t (30) = 3.18, p = .003).  
Table 5 shows the mean percentage of attribution types for the positive and 
negative questions. As the data were not normally distributed, a series of Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted to investigate differences between the groups for 
attribution types. No significant differences between the groups were made for the mean 
percentage of internal (U = 121.00, Z = -0.206, p = .837), external-personal (U = 81.00, 
Z = -1.723, p = .085), or external-situational (U = 109.00, Z = -0.649, p = .516) 
attributions made for the positive questions. There were also no significant differences 
for the mean percentage of internal (U = 111.50, Z = -0.619, p = .536), external-personal 
(U = 116.50, Z = -0.361, p = .718) or external-situational (U = 109.00, Z = -0.814, p = 
.415) attributions made for the negative questions.  
 
Table 5. 
Mean percentage (sd) scores on the dialogue task 
 Psychosis/grandiose group 
(n=18) 
Depressed controls 
(n=14) 
Total recording time (minutes) 3.46 (1.29) 3.02 (1.71) 
Total speech phrases 67.39 (28.81) 44.57 (18.49) 
Mental state words 4.49 (1.15) 5.91 (1.39) 
Positive questions   
   Internal 1.09 (1.47) 1.39 (2.50) 
   External-Personal 3.12 (2.26) 2.36 (3.29) 
   External-Situational 2.46 (1.93) 2.41 (2.86) 
Negative questions   
   Internal 1.10 (1.77) 1.99 (2.88) 
   External-Personal 4.97 (3.70) 4.32 (2.26) 
   External-Situational 0.90 (1.66) 0.49 (1.10) 
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Analyses by Delusions 
Demographics. Table 6 shows the frequency of each delusion across the 
sample. As expected, there was substantial comorbidity of symptoms within the sample. 
15 out of 19 people with a persecutory delusion also had a grandiose delusion. Out of 
the 19 people with a grandiose delusion, 15 also had a persecutory delusion, 15 a 
religious delusion, and 15 had ideas of reference and influence.  
The relationship between delusion type and ToM. Table 7 shows the ToM 
performance of the sample based on symptomology. Independent group t-tests revealed 
that participants with persecutory ideation - as measured by the PDI – performed 
significantly lower on the joke appreciation task (t (30) = 2.24, p = .033) but not the 
stories task (t (30) = 1.06, p = .299). Participants with ideas of reference and influence - 
another symptom associated with paranoid ideation – did not perform lower on the joke 
appreciation task (t (30) = 1.12, p = .274) but struggled significantly on the stories tasks 
(t (29.86) = 4.43, p < .0001). Participants endorsing the ideas of reference and influence 
questions performed significantly poorer on the deception stories in particular 
(deception t (30) = 3.57, p < 0.001; false-belief task t (29.02) = 1.86, p = .72).  
There was a significant difference between those with and without a grandiose 
delusion on both the joke appreciation task (t (30) =4.25, p < .001), and stories task (t 
(30) = 2.53, p = .017). When controlling for total memory score on the stories task, the 
significant effect for endorsement of grandiose delusions survived, F(1, 29) =5.16, p = 
.031, u = .151). Within the stories task the presence of grandiose delusions indicated 
significantly poorer performance on the false belief stories in particular (false-belief t 
(30) = 2.29, p = .029; deception t (30) = 1.15, p = .261). When controlling for the false-
belief memory questions, this effect did not remain significant (F(1, 29) = 3.76, p = 
.062).  
 Table 6. 
Demographics of the sample displaying particular symptomology (mean and (sd)) 
 Paranoid symptoms Grandiose symptoms 
    Persecutory delusion (n=19) Reference and influence (n=20) Grandiose delusion (n=19) Religious delusion (n=14) 
Age 38.84 (9.88) 43.80 (11.27) 43.74 (12.75) 43.80 (11.27) 
IQ 106.37 (12.27) 109.10 (9.96) 107.11 (11.08) 109.10 (9.96) 
Medication 1.21 (1.03) 1.30 (1.08) 1.37 (1.17) 1.30 (1.08) 
Education (years) 14.47 (1.71) 13.80 (1.40) 14.26 (1.88) 13.80 (1.40) 
Illness (years) 10.79 (9.07) 10.50 (8.76) 12.42 (11.10) 10.50 (8.76) 
HADS Depression 9.21 (5.73) 7.45 (5.88) 5.95 (5.30) 7.45 (5.88) 
HADS Anxiety 10.74 (5.00) 9.60 (5.34) 8.11 (4.85) 9.60 (5.34) 
ARMS Mania 6.21 (4.50) 6.05 (3.71) 7.42 (4.57) 6.05 (3.71) 
Total PDI score 120.74 (49.31) 109.45 (55.92) 109.26 (56.65) 124.00 (53.88) 
     PDI Distress 2.74 (2.45) 2.80 (2.42) 3.47 (1.95) 2.80 (2.42) 
     PDI Preoccupation 4.42 (3.98) 4.45 (3.87) 5.42 (3.27) 4.45 (3.87) 
     PDI Conviction 4.84 (3.80) 5.05 (4.08) 6.63 (3.06) 5.05 (4.08) 
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Given that religious delusions are often reported in conjunction with grandiose 
and persecutory delusions (Getz, Fleck & Strakowski, 2001) this symptom was also 
explored. Those with a religious delusion were found to perform worse on the jokes task 
(t (30) =2.91, p = .007), and the total ToM stories score was lower for those with this 
symptom (t (30) = 2.22, p = .035). However, neither false belief nor deception 
understanding were compromised in the presence of this type of delusion (false-belief t 
(30) =1.44, p = .160; deception t (30) = 1.38, p = .177).  The significant effect of the 
presence of religious delusions on ToM stories performance did not remain after 
controlling for total memory score (F(1, 29) = 3.787, p = .061).  
To examine the specificity of the ToM difficulties described above to the 
particular delusions, a series of one-way ANCOVAS were performed. First, joke 
appreciation between groups who did or did not endorse experiencing grandiose 
delusions remained significant when controlling for the severity of comorbid 
persecutory delusions in the group (F(1, 29) = 13.50, p < .001). When controlling for 
the severity of comorbid delusions of reference, the association between grandiosity and 
performance on the stories task just failed to reach significance (F(1, 29) = 3.98, p = 
.056).  
The presence of persecutory delusions failed to predict joke task performance in 
this group when controlling for the severity of comorbid grandiosity (F(1, 29) = 1.57, p 
= .220). There was a significant association between religious delusions and the joke 
task after controlling for the severity of comorbid persecutory delusions (F(1, 29) = 
4.97, p = .034) but no significant difference with the stories task after controlling for 
ideas of reference (F(1, 29) = 3.37, p = .076).  
 
  
Table 7. 
Mean (sd) IPSAQ personalising bias (PB) score and ToM performance based on symptomology 
 Paranoid symptoms Grandiose symptoms 
    Persecutory delusion Ideas of reference and influence Grandiose delusion Religious delusion 
 With Without With Without With Without With Without 
ToM joke task 13.37 (4.61) 16.92 (4.09) 14.10 (3.71) 16.00 (5.97) 12.47 (2.93) 18.23 (4.75) 12.36 (3.13) 16.72 (4.87) 
ToM stories 5.16 (1.39) 5.69 (1.44) 4.70 (1.26) 6.50 (0.80) 4.89 (1.37) 6.08 (1.19) 4.79 (1.31) 5.83 (1.34) 
     Deception 2.58 (1.02) 2.77 (1.24) 2.20 (1.06) 3.42 (0.67) 2.47 (1.07) 2.92 (1.12) 2.36 (1.01) 2.89 (1.13) 
     False-belief 2.85 (1.02) 2.77 (1.24) 2.55 (0.95) 3.08 (0.67) 2.47 (0.84) 3.15 (0.80) 2.50 (0.86) 2.94 (0.87) 
IPSAQ PB 0.51 (0.31) 0.56 (0.37) 0.56 (0.26) 0.53 (0.39) 0.40 (0.26) 0.64 (0.36) 0.44 (0.30) 0.67 (0.37) 
  
The relationship between the severity of delusions and the presence of a 
personalising bias. One-way ANOVAs revealed no association between the 
personalising bias with the severity of persecutory ideation (F(1, 31) = 0.13, p = .721), 
ideas of reference (F(1, 31) = 0.07, p = .801) or religious delusion (F(1, 31) = 3.58, p = 
.068). However, there was a significant association with a personalising bias and the 
severity of grandiose ideation (F(1, 31) = 4.29, p = .047) but this finding became non-
significant after controlling for ideas of reference and persecutory delusions (F(1, 28) = 
3.07, p = .091).  
Exploring the association between ToM and the personalising bias. Only 
performance on the jokes test was explored in these analyses because like the IPSAQ, 
the joke task is an inductive, ambiguous task while the stories task is much less 
ambiguous and more deductive (Corcoran et al., 2011). An independent t-test was 
conducted with group defined as presence or absence of a personalising bias and jokes 
test performance as the DV. Those with a personalising bias (n = 12) performed poorer 
on the joke appreciation task (mean = 12.05, SD = 5.30) than those without (mean = 
16.06, SD = 3.26). However, this result was not significant (t (30) = 1.196, p = .241). 
Interestingly, those with a personalising bias were found to make more mental state 
inferences on the dialogue task, but this was not significant (t (14.84) = -1.23, p = .239). 
Discussion 
This study tested the application of socio-cognitive models of paranoid 
delusions (Frith, 1992; Bentall & Kinderman, 1998) to grandiose delusions. The current 
study did not, however, find any significant results in relation to attributional style as 
measured by the IPSAQ and the dialogue task. These results are in contrast to the study 
by Jolley et al. (2006) who found that patients with grandiose delusions and a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia showed externalising and self-serving attributional biases, in contrast 
to the ―depressive‖ cognitive style associated with persecutory delusions. Reasons for 
  
these non-significant findings may relate to the use of a depressed control group who 
were receiving cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) at the time of recruitment. A key 
central component of CBT for patients receiving pharmacological support involves 
addressing attributional style and close monitoring of times when the client may falsely 
attribute a negative event internally, as opposed to externally (Peterson et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, it is possible other factors not measured in this study, such as different 
affective states (e.g. anger or self-esteem) could have influenced attributional style and 
would be worthwhile accounting for in future research.  
To test ToM this study employed both verbal and nonverbal, and implicit 
(dialogue and the jokes task) and explicit (stories task) measures. These dichotomies 
have been well documented in the ToM literature (Frith & Frith, 2008) and researchers 
have questioned whether patients with psychosis demonstrate both explicit and implicit 
ToM impairments by adopting a variety of measures. As predicted, this study found 
those experiencing grandiose delusions performed significantly worse on both the ToM 
jokes and stories task than depressed controls. The most sensitive measure on the stories 
task was the second-order false belief questions. Thus, participants with grandiose 
delusions struggled to make inferences about a person‘s false attribution of belief.  
Frith (2004) proposes that online mentalising is also impoverished in people 
experiencing psychosis. The results of the dialogue task revealed that participants 
experiencing grandiose delusions made less implicit references to mental states. These 
results are in line with recent studies which have found patients with schizophrenia have 
shown implicit theory of mind impairments in ‗on-line‘ mentalising tasks (Horan et al., 
2009; Pederson et al., 2012; Russell, Reynaud, Herba, Morris & Corcoran, 2006; 
Stewart et al., 2009). However, participants with grandiose delusions in the present 
study did demonstrate appropriate (although less frequent) use of mentalising language. 
However, there were differences in the overall diversity of ToM words used by 
  
participants in the dialogue task. Where some speech contained predominantly the 
words "think", 'know" and "remember", others contained much more sophisticated 
references to complex thoughts and feelings. It must be highlighted that coders included 
a range of different types of words referring to mental states overall - references to 
one‘s own mental states and emotions, as well as reference to others‘ mental states and 
emotions. Future studies would do well to code these separately using various verbal 
topics to prompt a larger variety of verbal speech for analysis. 
The role of a grandiose delusion 
Across the whole sample, this study found that persecutory delusions and 
grandiose delusions are significantly associated with ToM performance. More 
interestingly, the association between grandiose delusions and ToM performance on the 
jokes task remained after controlling for the presence and severity of persecutory 
delusions. This supports the tentative model put forward by Knowles et al. (2011) who 
propose that ToM may contribute to the maintenance of grandiose delusions, just as 
they do to persecutory delusions, and may also play a role in the dynamic shift between 
both types of delusions. They propose that as a result of negative fluctuations in self-
esteem, individuals with grandiose delusions may believe they have a special power or 
ability that others wish to steal or destroy, resulting in secondary persecutory delusions. 
Alternatively, grandiose delusions may emerge from existing persecutory delusions, 
since positive fluctuations in self-esteem may lead the individual to believe that the 
intention of others to persecute or follow them are due to something that the individual 
holds of great worth. This may explain the frequent co-morbidity between both delusion 
subtypes (Jolley et al., 2006), which were also demonstrated in this study.  
Study Limitations and Future Research 
This study is affected by a number of limitations. Whilst acknowledging that this 
is a preliminary study, it may have been beneficial to investigate whether either the 
  
ToM or attributional scores were associated with a third socio-cognitive bias that is 
reportedly found in patients with paranoia - the data-gathering bias. Also known as the 
‗jumping-to-conclusions‘ bias, this phenomenon has been shown by Garety and 
colleagues who postulated that the tendency to take into account less information before 
reaching decisions is also involved in the maintenance of delusions (Garety & Hemsley, 
1987; Garety, 1991). The additional exploration of the samples performance on tasks 
measuring the presence of a data gathering bias may have allowed additional insight 
into the development of grandiose delusions. This bias has also been shown to be 
strongly associated with levels of conviction, but not of distress and pre-occupation with 
delusions. Recent research has found that individuals with grandiose delusions are more 
likely to show a reasoning bias than those with persecutory delusions (Garety et al., 
2012). Future research may wish to consider the relationship between this bias, theory 
of mind and attributional style in larger samples. 
As proposed by Corcoran et al. (1997), the results of a study which compares the 
performance of participants experiencing psychosis to that of participants with 
depression might provide a better basis for an explanation of the humour deficit in 
schizophrenia. The recruitment of a depressed group in this study was to ensure that any 
differences found in attributional style cannot be explained by co-morbid depression 
which has been shown to be characterised by a distinct attributional style (Bentall et al., 
1991). Nonetheless, future research would benefit from the inclusion of a non-clinical 
second control group to further investigate attributional style in adults with grandiose 
delusions. 
The inter-rater reliability for the dialogue task achieved a high percentage of 
agreement for the attributional style (92.58%) and the frequency counts of implicit 
mental state references (r = .98). These high reliability scores are likely to have been a 
result of clear operational definitions. Stewart et al. (2008) failed to provide inter-rater 
  
reliability checks in their study and it is highly recommended that future research 
ensures that findings which relate to verbal transactions take into account raters‘ 
observations of references that can be extremely subtle in nature. 
This study included participants with grandiose delusions from both an inpatient 
and outpatient setting. It could be argued this heterogeneity allows us to generalise the 
ToM impairment across the population experiencing this symptom, given that recent 
views support the continuum theory of psychotic experiences (Strauss, 1969; van Os, 
Hannsenn, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000). However, future research may wish to explore 
differences between participants who are in remission compared to participants in the 
acute stage in order to explore whether ToM ability varies with severity of illness. 
Overall, ToM tests are very diverse with some tasks more sensitive to the effects of 
demographic variables such as age and IQ (Corcoran et al., 2011; Shryane et al., 2008). 
Participants in this study experiencing higher levels of mania may have been less 
inhibited when responding to questions. Thus, the overall word count in the 
conversational task may not have been the most sensitive covariate, although it is 
generally very difficult to control for this aspect. However, both the WASI vocabulary 
measure and estimate of full IQ was equal between both groups, and is therefore not a 
factor that can account for the group difference in proportion of mental state words.  
Additional differences between the groups included the significantly higher 
number of atypical explanations made by patients in the psychosis group when 
attempting to explain the joke behind the ToM cartoons. Furthermore, this difference 
remained when controlling for thought disorder. Regrettably, this study did not record 
verbatim the unusual explanations given for the humour stimuli. For example, one 
participant described a cartoon of a woman hiding behind a couch as ―a prostitute in a 
window and some people are looking to buy a kitchen there‖. Not only would this allow 
a second rater to improve reliability of the subjective assessment of grading ‗ToMness‘ 
  
in these answers, but a qualitative analysis might have revealed interesting themes 
across participants who provided atypical explanations of what they perceived to be the 
intention of the artist who drew the cartoon jokes. Nonetheless, this finding provides 
support to the hypothesis that although patients experiencing grandiose delusions find 
cartoons amusing to the same extent as controls (there were no significant differences 
for the reported subjective humour appreciation for the jokes) it appears that they find 
different aspects of the jokes humorous.  
Finally, this study recruited close to the number of participants stipulated by the 
power analysis which stated a total sample size of 34 participants would be required to 
achieve 80% power. These significant results achieved a large effect size for the jokes 
task (r = .55) and the stories task (r = .49). However, when controlling for memory 
performance on the stories task this effect size did become smaller (u = .22), suggesting 
that future research studies may wish to investigate the role of memory in relation to 
ToM in people with grandiose delusions. 
Clinical Implications 
A theoretical understanding of the role of ToM deficits or attributional biases in 
grandiose delusions could help clinicians develop appropriately targeted psychological 
interventions. Treatment is problematic in the presence of grandiose delusions which 
predict poor clinical outcome in adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and are 
negatively correlated with medication compliance transdiagnostically (Thara & Eaton, 
1996; Applebaum & Gutheil, 1980). Furthermore, grandiose beliefs tend to be held with 
particularly strong conviction (Applebaum et al., 1999). People with grandiose 
delusions are reported to be challenging to engage therapeutically because of the 
positive mood and self-esteem associated with these delusions, which may hold low 
motivation for change (Garety et al., 2012; Knowles et al., 2011). Thus, theory of mind 
impairments may well go under-recognised and  may be a cognitive ability that 
  
clinicians may wish to assess in clinical assessments. Therapeutic interventions must be 
tailored and developed specifically to address this cognitive impairment when patients 
present with this delusional content. Individuals with ToM impairments may be less 
likely to understand the impact of their behaviour upon others, and may be more likely 
to engage in reckless or dangerous behaviours if they cannot infer the perspectives of 
others (Kerr et al., 2003). Such socio-cognitive difficulties might be amenable to 
cognitive restructuring within therapy which addresses unhelpful appraisals of events in 
relation to mood. Furthermore, this study has implications for therapists providing 
mentalisation-based therapy (MBT) who may wish to encourage patients to consider 
taking the time to seek information or clues in social scenarios in which patients have to 
recognise or understand the emotions and intentions of themselves or others. 
Conclusions 
There is a strong need for a better theoretical understanding of the role of 
cognitive processes in grandiose delusions (Knowles et al., 2011). The significant 
findings of a ToM deficit in individuals with grandiose as well as persecutory delusions 
should stimulate further research into cognitive styles within a more narrow and specific 
symptom investigation. Future research would benefit from administering a wider 
battery of neurocognitive tasks such as measures of working memory, attention or 
verbal fluency. Furthermore, the inclusion of both a non-clinical and a psychiatric 
control group to ensure that any impairments are symptom-specific would strengthen 
findings. Further exploration of ToM and attributional style in individuals experiencing 
grandiose delusions may have implications for the clinical treatment and management 
of this type of experience. 
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Appendix A. Quality Appraisal Tool 
Question/checklist item Adapted from tool Response Scoring 
Reporting 
1. Is the hypothesis/aim/objective of the study clearly described? 
 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
1 
0 
2. Is the choice of study method appropriate? Health Evidence 
Bulletins-Wales 
Yes 
No 
1 
0 
3. Is the population studied appropriate? Was an appropriate control group used – i.e. were groups 
comparable on important confounding factors? 
Health Evidence 
Bulletins-Wales 
Yes 
No 
1 
0 
4. Are the main outcomes to be measured clearly described in the Introduction or Methods section? 
If the main outcomes are first mentioned in the Results section, the question should be answered 
no. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
1 
0 
5. Are the characteristics of the patients included in the study clearly described? A case-definition 
and the source for the controls should be given. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
1 
0 
6. Are the distributions of principal confounders in each group of subjects clearly described? Downs & Black Yes 
Partially 
No 
2 
1 
0 
7. Are the main findings of the study clearly described? Simple outcome data should be reported for 
all major findings so that the reader can check the major analyses and conclusions. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
1 
0 
8. Are tables/graphs adequately labelled and understandable? Health Evidence 
Bulletins-Wales 
Yes 
No 
1 
0 
9. Does the study provide estimates of the random variability in the data for the main outcomes? 
The standard error, standard deviation or confidence intervals should be reported. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
1 
0 
10. Have actual probability values been reported (e.g. 0.035 rather than <0.05) for the main outcomes 
except where the probability value is less than 0.001? 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
1 
0 
  
External validity 
11. Were the subjects asked to participate in the study representative from of the entire population 
from which they were recruited? The study must identify the source population and describe how 
the patients were selected. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
12. Were those subjects who were prepared to participate representative of the entire population 
from which they were recruited? The proportion of those asked who agreed to participate should 
be stated. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
Internal validity - bias 
13. Was an attempt made to blind study subjects to the differences of the measures they have 
received? For studies where the participants would have no way of knowing what the outcome 
measures aim to explore (to prevent socially desirable answers), this should be answered yes. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
14. Was an attempt made to blind those measuring the main outcomes of the intervention? Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
15. Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate? Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
Internal validity – confounding 
16. Were the participants and controls recruited from the same population? Patients for all 
comparison groups should be selected from the same population. This question is answered unable 
to determine where there is no information concerning the source of patients included in the 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
1 
0 
0 
  
study. determine 
17. Were the participants and controls recruited over the same period of time? For a study which 
does not specify the time period over which patients were recruited, the question should be 
answered as unable to determine. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
18. Was there adequate adjustment for confounding in the analyses from which the main findings 
were drawn? The question should be answered no if known confounders were not taken into 
account in the analyses or if possible confounders were described but not investigated. 
Downs & Black Yes 
No 
Unable to 
determine 
1 
0 
0 
19. Did the study have sufficient power to detect a clinically important affect where the probability 
value for a difference being due to chance is less than 5%? Studies that do not report an effect size 
should be answered no. 
Downs & Black Reported 
Not reported 
1 
0 
Note. Several questions of the Downs and Black checklist (questions 4, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, and 26) were omitted as these 
were considered to be specific to intervention/treatment studies, randomised trials or irrelevant to observational studies. Questions were 
taken from the Health Evidence Bulletins-Wales checklist if they were considered relevant but not covered by the Downs and Black tool. 
  
 
Appendix B. Poor Quality Studies Excluded from the Review 
 
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
characteristics (n) 
 
Humour task 
 
Additional measures 
 
Comprehension 
deficit? 
 
Appreciation 
deficit? 
 
Other findings 
 
 
QR 
Falkenberg 
et al. (2007) 
 
Schizophrenia (18) 
Non-clinical controls 
(18) 
STCI, CHS, 3WD test of 
humour appreciation 
 
PANNS, BDI   Patients indicated non-
understanding more often than 
the control group. Patient group 
reached higher scores for 
seriousness and bad mood than 
the controls, and lower 
cheerfulness trait scores. 
Depression was positively 
correlated with bad mood and 
negatively correlated with 
cheerfulness. No differences 
found between groups for coping 
humour or for preferred type of 
humour or for funniness or 
aversiveness ratings. 
 
6 
Note. 3WD=3 Witz-Dimension test of humour appreciation, BDI=Beck’s Depression Inventory, CHS=Coping Humour Scale, PANAS=The Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale, STCI= State and Trait Cheerfulness Inventory 
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Appendix C: NHS Ethical Approval 
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Appendix D: R&D Approval (South West Yorkshire Partnership Trust) 
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Appendix E: R&D Approval (Sheffield Health and Social Care Trust) 
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Appendix F: Study Invitation Letter to Clinicians 
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Appendix G: PowerPoint Presentation Slides to Clinical Teams 
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Appendix H: Participant Information Sheet – Grandiose Group 
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Appendix I: Participant Information Sheet – Depressed Group 
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Appendix J: Consent Form 
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Appendix K: Screening Questionnaire 
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Appendix L: Peters Delusion Inventory-21 (PDI-21) 
 
Note. For the purpose of the eThesis, this document has been removed for copyright 
reasons. Copies are available on request by the author of this measure.  
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Appendix M: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
Note. For the purpose of the eThesis, this document has been removed for copyright 
reasons. Copies are available on request by the author of this measure.  
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Appendix N: Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (AMRS) 
Note. For the purpose of the eThesis, this document has been removed for copyright 
reasons. Copies are available on request by the author of this measure.  
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Appendix O: Task: Theory of Mind Stories 
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Appendix P: Cartoon Jokes Task 
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Typical joke explanations 
Minnie Mouse: someone is taking the mickey (no pun intended!) out of her by putting 
on a toilet seat with two lids which looks like her. 
Message: he was intending to put his letter in a bottle and send it out to sea to be saved. 
Tusks: the elephant has taken his tusks out and put them in a glass overnight like people 
do with false teeth. 
Penguin: the penguin is wondering here the banana skin came from that he has just 
slipped on. 
Hole in one: they don‘t know the island is sinking – (it‘s like a plug) 
Ping-pong: the couple are pretending to play table tennis so the mum doesn‘t know 
they are otherwise occupied. 
Visitors: she is hiding from the people who have knocked because she doesn‘t want to 
see them but she doesn‘t realise they can see her reflection and so know that she is in 
and hiding from them. 
Talkative wife: the husband has a mask on the side of his face so his wife thinks he is 
listening attentively whilst she knits, when really he is reading his book 
Dog and bone: the dog thinks the spanner is a bone. 
Gondola: the people in the gondola are getting annoyed by/ being distracted by the 
singer who doesn‘t know that he is about to be sawn off and sink. 
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Rating scales 
Typicality: 
0= typical/ common/ usual explanation given 
1= atypical/ uncommon/unusual; explanation given. 
 
Mentalizing scale: 
0 = not got 
1 = entirely physical or behavioural interpretation of the joke with no reference to 
mental states. 
2 = an interpretation in terms of mental / emotional states is suspected but can only be 
inferred because there is no explicit reference to mental states in the explanation 
offered. 
3 = an interpretation which explains the joke in terms of the character(s) mental/ 
emotional state using explicit mental or emotional state terms. 
 
Funniness rating: 
Ask participant to rate each joke for funniness out of 5 with 0 being not at all funny and 
5 being hysterically funny. 
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Appendix Q: Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ) 
 
Note. For the purpose of the eThesis, this document has been removed for copyright 
reasons. Copies are available on request by the author of this measure.  
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Appendix R. Means and Standard Deviations for the ToM Stories 
 Grandiose group 
(n=18) 
Depressed 
controls 
(n=14) 
Statistical 
test 
 Mean SD Mean SD t(30) 
Deception tasks      
   ToM deception 2.44 1.10 2.93 1.07 1.25 
   Memory deception 3.67 0.69 3.93 0.27 1.35 
   Inference deception 3.28 0.83 3.64 0.50 1.46 
   Reality deception 3.67 0.59 3.71 0.47 0.25 
False-belief tasks      
   ToM false-belief 2.39 0.78 3.21 0.80 2.94* 
   Memory false-belief 3.22 0.81 3.7 0.63 2.73* 
   Inference false-belief 3.22 1.06 3.57 0.51 1.13 
   Reality false-belief 3.67 0.59 3.57 0.65 -0.43 
*p<0.01 
 
 
